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Abstract: This study provides evidence that high-frequency traders (HFTs) identify patterns in
past trades and orders that allow them to anticipate and trade ahead of other investors’ order flow.
Specifically, HFTs’ aggressive purchases and sales lead those of other investors, and this effect is
stronger at times when it is more difficult for non-HFTs to disguise their order flow. Consistent
with some HFTs being more skilled or more focused on anticipatory strategies, I show that trades
from a subset of HFTs consistently predict non-HFT order flow the best. The results are not
explained by HFTs reacting faster to news or past returns, by contrarian or trend-chasing behavior
by non-HFTs, or by trader misclassification. These findings support the existence of an anticipatory
trading channel through which HFTs increase non-HFT trading costs.
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Investors and regulators have immense interest in the automated strategies used by high-frequency
traders (HFTs) and how they affect other investors. Liquidity provision by HFTs has clear benefits.
Yet HFTs make many informed trades; more than half their dollar volume on NASDAQ comes from
marketable trades that must predict returns to be profitable. The welfare consequences of this
informed trading are less clear. In particular, a prominent concern is that one way HFTs predict
returns is by using past trade and order data to learn which stocks non-HFTs are about to buy or
sell. This information is valuable because an HFT who infers a non-HFT is beginning to liquidate
a large position can sell shares now and profit when the price subsequently falls.
This paper examines these issues and provides the first evidence that one reason HFTs appear
informed is that they anticipate and trade ahead of non-HFT buying and selling pressure. Specifi-
cally, I analyze return and trade patterns around periods of intense marketable buying and selling
by HFTs. The imbalance between these marketable purchases and sales is a simple measure of
HFTs’ directional bets.1 Anticipatory trading implies HFTs trade in the same direction as their
expectation of future non-HFT order flow. Consistent with HFTs using such a strategy, I show
that when HFTs sell a stock with marketable orders, this predicts future marketable selling by
non-HFTs and lower returns.
This strategy has important implications for liquidity and price efficiency. If a non-HFT is selling
to fund a liquidity shock, the HFT’s selling harms the non-HFT by depressing their liquidation
price (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005). If instead the non-HFT is selling because the stock is
overvalued, the HFT is effectively reverse engineering the non-HFT’s signal (Madrigal 1996, Yang
and Zhu 2019, Baldauf and Mollner 2020). Competition between the HFT and non-HFT to trade
on the signal causes prices to incorporate this information faster.2 But it also implies moderated
benefits of HFT participation in price discovery, because some information arriving via HFT trades
would soon be incorporated into prices by non-HFTs anyway. Additionally, the competition lowers
non-HFT profits, which reduces their incentive to acquire information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980,
1A marketable limit order is functionally equivalent to a market order: a buy order with a limit price at or above
the best ask or a sell order with a limit price at or below the best bid at the time it enters the order book. NASDAQ
requires all orders to have a limit price, and a trade is initiated when a marketable limit order crosses either the best
bid or best ask.
2Non-HFTs may at first trade less aggressively to hide from HFTs, slowing price adjustment. But once the HFT
has learned how the non-HFT is trading, competition between them ultimately pushes prices closer to fundamental
value (Madrigal 1996, Yang and Zhu 2019).
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Stiglitz 2014, Weller 2018).3 These concerns were the basis for Michael Lewis’s (2014) book, Flash
Boys, and the founding of the deliberately slowed down IEX trading platform.
The analysis in this paper uses an entire year of unique trade and trader-level data from the
NASDAQ Stock Market. It is an important sample for studying HFTs given NASDAQ was the
biggest U.S. exchange by volume and HFTs accounted for 40% of its dollar volume.
In tests where stocks are sorted by HFT net marketable buying at the one second horizon, non-
HFT net marketable buying for the stocks bought most aggressively by HFTs rises by a cumulative
65% of its one-second standard deviation over the following thirty seconds. For the median stock,
this equates to a 100 share HFT imbalance predicting non-HFTs to buy 13 more shares with
marketable orders than they sell. The figures for stocks HFTs sell most aggressively are similar,
but in the opposite direction. Turning to returns, future returns for stocks HFTs buy aggressively
are positive, while returns for stocks they sell aggressively are negative. The returns and non-HFT
trade imbalances predicted by these sorts persist for more than five minutes.
The sorts also show who provides liquidity to these marketable HFT trades. For the stocks
HFTs buy with marketable trades, their net buying is also positive in the surrounding seconds.
Thus at these times HFTs in aggregate take liquidity from non-HFTs.
The evidence is consistent with HFTs recognizing persistent informed non-HFT order flow in
real time. Since liquidity providers are slow to update their quotes, HFTs trade ahead of the
impending non-HFT order flow and associated price change to earn a profit. I provide two example
patterns that illustrate how HFTs could identify stocks with persistent order flow and prices that
update slowly. The examples are simple, interpretable, and use only past order flow and returns as
their inputs. Though HFTs use more sophisticated algorithms, the example patterns nonetheless
succeed in predicting future non-HFT order flow and returns. And HFT order flow in surrounding
seconds is consistent with the patterns capturing predictability used by HFTs.
I next examine whether some HFTs are more skilled at anticipating order flow. There is evidence
HFTs follow a variety of strategies (Boehmer, Li, and Saar 2018) and fast HFTs are more profitable
(Baron, Brogaard, Hagstro¨mer, and Kirilenko 2019). Consistent with HFTs having heterogenous
skills, there is persistence in which individual HFTs’ trades most strongly predict non-HFT order
3These incentive effects arise when HFTs learn from the endogenous order flow of non-HFTs who pay a cost for
their signals. This is absent from models in which the speculative HFT’s trades do not affect the signal itself, such
as Foucault, Hombert, and Rosu (2016).
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flow. I sort HFTs into three groups each month based on the size of coefficients from regressions
of non-HFT order flow on the HFTs’ lagged trading (excluding predictability from trend-chasing
by non-HFTs and serial correlation in non-HFT order flow). For HFTs in the top third the prior
month, a one-standard deviation shock to their net marketable buying predicts a cumulative change
in non-HFT net marketable buying equal to 14% of its one-second standard deviation over the next
30 seconds. This compares to an estimate of 2% for HFTs in the bottom third. These top HFTs’
trades are also more strongly correlated with future returns. This skill persistence result holds
regardless whether individual HFTs are sorted based on correlations with their net marketable
buying or total net buying (summing marketable and non-marketable trades).
These findings imply that large non-HFTs have an incentive to disguise their order flow, and
in reality we see them deploy execution algorithms to achieve this goal. Yet in the competition
between HFT and non-HFT algorithms, non-HFTs are at a disadvantage to the extent that they
are constrained by their desire to enter or exit their position. Dark pool operator ITG writes,
“some traders are more willing to increase fill rate at the expense of execution quality—the risk of
information leakage and impact”(ITG 2013). Indeed, I find the correlation between HFT and non-
HFT trades is stronger at times non-HFTs are impatient and thus less focused on disguising order
flow: at the market open, on days with high volume, and when trading illiquid or small-cap stocks.
This is consistent with Goldman Sachs’ acknowledgement their algorithms leak more information
in small-caps (Traders Magazine 2013).
I consider several explanations for marketable HFT trades leading marketable non-HFT trades.
The effect could be caused by HFTs reacting faster to a signal non-HFTs also observe (Von Beschwitz,
Keim, and Massa 2015, Chordia, Green, and Kottimukkalur 2018). But the most probable signals
they would both utilize in close succession do not fully explain the results (e.g., past returns, news
articles, analyst forecasts and recommendations, management guidance, and form 8-K filings). Con-
trols for returns also show the effect is not due to a reverse causality story in which HFT purchases
cause trend chasing non-HFTs to purchase shares as well. Another explanation is trade misclassi-
fication. Perhaps NASDAQ incorrectly labels some HFT trades as coming from non-HFTs. Then
the lead-lag result may be caused by trades from correctly labeled HFTs predicting those of incor-
rectly labled HFTs who follow similar strategies. I evaluate this explanation by comparing the way
HFT trading forecasts itself to how it forecasts non-HFT trading. Misclassification implies that
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non-HFT predictability comes from it being a noisy proxy for HFT trading, so HFT trading should
predict itself better than non-HFT trades. Once you look more than seven seconds into the future,
HFT marketable trades forecast non-HFT marketable trades more strongly than HFT marketable
trades. By 15 seconds later, HFT marketable trading no longer forecasts itself, whereas it continues
to forecast non-HFT marketable trading for more than 30 seconds.
Another question is whether the results are more consistent with HFTs trading ahead of order
flow to avoid losses on market making inventory positions or to profit from speculation. To evaluate
this question, I examine cumulative HFT net buying for stocks in extreme HFT net marketable
buying portfolios before and after the sort second. There is no evidence marketable HFT trades are
predominately caused by inventory management. It is possible the marketable trades are disposing
of inventory acquired on exchanges other than NASDAQ. However, additional evidence is more
consistent with a speculative interpretation. Marketable trades are more than half of HFT volume,
which is inconsistent with a pure risk management motive. Additionally, HFT trades lead non-HFT
trades more strongly early in the trading day and in small-cap stocks, whereas inventory risk is
more binding towards the end of the day and HFT market making is more prevalent in large-cap
stocks (Yao and Ye 2018).
This paper makes an important contribution to our understanding of predictability in order flow.
In a lower frequency context, Barbon, Di Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2019) and Di Maggio,
Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2019) show evidence of non-HFT brokers leaking information
about one non-HFT client’s trades to other non-HFT clients. Clark-Joseph (2013) studies a form
of anticipatory trading in S&P 500 futures, though his focus is whether HFTs use small trades to
learn about price impact. Recent work using data from Canada (Korajczyk and Murphy 2019)
and Sweden (Van Kervel and Menkveld 2019) shows HFTs initially providing liquidity at the start
of large multi-hour institutional orders before switching to trade in the same direction as the
institutional order after 30 or more minutes.4 Using U.S. equities data, this paper complements
those studies by showing that if you condition on higher frequency second-by-second data, you
observe HFTs taking liquidity ahead of non-HFTs at more favorable prices. I also provide evidence
that HFTs’ ability to predict order flow is not limited to the latter part of large orders. Specifically,
4Reiss and Werner’s (1998) evidence on dealers trading ahead of worked orders is also related, though in their
setting the presumption is the customer intends for the dealer to acquire the position beforehand.
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HFT marketable trades predict non-HFT marketable trades more strongly the first half hour of
trading, which is necessarily early in a multi-hour order. And the second-level spikes in HFT
marketable imbalances coincide with spikes in non-HFT marketable imbalances, which shows the
patterns in this paper are distinct from longer-term trends.
These findings relate to a broader debate about the merits of modern market structure.5 Re-
search shows that faster trading technology and more HFT liquidity provision are generally asso-
ciated with improvements in common liquidity measures.6 There is also evidence a fair portion of
price discovery comes from algorithmic traders in general (O’Hara, Yao, and Ye 2014) and HFTs
in particular (Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan 2014, 2019). But while the net effect of the
transition to electronic markets may be positive, there are also channels through which fast trading
can have a negative impact. Examples include increased liquidity provider losses to cross-market
arbitrage (Budish, Cramton, and Shim 2015) and to news trading (Menkveld and Zoican 2017).
This paper highlights another negative channel. It shows one way HFTs predict returns is by
extracting information from informed non-HFT order flow. This is important, because a non-HFT
whose trades are anticipated either trades fewer shares than they desire or obtains executions at
a worse average price. These effects are hard to detect with standard liquidity measures. Doing
so requires conditioning on the magnitude of a non-HFT’s liquidity shock or, if the non-HFT is
informed, the magnitude of their signal. I use a structural VAR to provide a rough estimate. The
results imply non-HFT price impact is 14% higher when they compete with HFTs using anticipatory
strategies.
1 Hypothesis Development
A speculator able to predict marketable trade imbalances could use this information to predict
returns and earn a profit (e.g., Madrigal (1996), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), and Yang and
5Other issues include the effects of alternative trading venues (Foucault and Menkveld 2008, O’Hara and Ye
2011, Comerton-Forde and Putnin, sˇ 2015), tick size (Chao, Yao, and Ye 2016, Yao and Ye 2018, O’Hara, Saar,
and Zhong 2019), high-frequency volatility (Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun 2017, Hasbrouck 2018, Egginton,
Van Ness, and Van Ness 2016), overinvestment in technology (Biais, Foucault, and Moinas 2015), and agency conflicts
caused by exchange fee rebates (Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings 2016).
6Examples include Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015), Hendershott and
Riordan (2013), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Conrad, Wahal, and Xiang (2015), Conrad and Wahal (2019), Brogaard,
Hagstromer, Norden, and Riordan (2016), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015), Menkveld (2013), Breckenfelder (2013),
Brogaard and Garriott (2019), Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2016), Brogaard, Carrion, Moyaert, Riordan, Shkilko, and
Sokolov (2017), and Griffith, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2017).
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Zhu (2019)). The idea is supported by evidence that marketable purchases lead to price increases
and marketable sales lead to price declines (Hasbrouck 1991). This happens because trades may
contain information about fundamental values (Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Kyle 1985) or cause
liquidity providers to take risky positions (Stoll 1978).
HFTs are good candidates for speculators who learn about order flow. Doing so requires fast
trading technology and automated analysis of quote updates and trades. And HFTs specifically
invest in these technologies.
This anticipatory trading hypothesis can be tested by comparing the timing of HFT marketable
trades to non-HFT marketable trades. Assume an HFT identifies a signal indicating there will be
non-HFT marketable selling in the near future. If the liquidity provider has not conditioned on
this signal, then the liquidity provider’s bid will be too high. The HFT should sell the stock with a
marketable limit order that hits the bid. Afterwards, non-HFTs will similarly sell with marketable
orders, driving the price lower and creating a profit for the HFT.
Hypothesis 1 HFT net marketable buying will be positively correlated with future non-HFT net
marketable buying and returns.
In principle, the HFT could also sell with a non-marketable order, but much of the variation in
HFTs’ non-marketable orders is caused by liquidity provision. By focusing on HFTs’ marketable
orders, I instead focus on times when their trades are more likely to be caused by information.
The second main hypothesis seeks to determine whether HFTs are anticipating non-HFTs trad-
ing for information or liquidity reasons. Price changes after HFTs’ trades provide insight into which
of these explanations is more typical.
Hypothesis 2 If HFTs anticipate informed order flow, price changes predicted by their marketable
trades will be permanent, whereas if they anticipate uninformed order flow, the price changes will
be temporary.
There are many plausible ways HFTs could learn about order flow. The one I emphasize is
insufficiently disguised positive serial correlation in order flow. Marketable buying is known to
have positive serial correlation (Hasbrouck 1991, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2002). This
can arise from splitting a large order into small trades executed over time. Order splitting is
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generally optimal for a trader who has discretion over when to trade, and it is useful for both
informed traders (Kyle 1985) and liquidity traders (Vayanos 2001). But this practice leaves open
the possibility that in executing the first part of an order, a large trader reveals more than he
intends. A similar type of information leakage can occur when a trader simultaneously sends orders
for a stock to different exchanges (e.g., NYSE and NASDAQ), but routing complications cause the
orders to arrive at those venues at different times (Lewis 2014). These signals may be profitable to
use if liquidity providers do not condition on them when setting bid-ask quotes.
Hypothesis 3 One way HFTs profit from anticipatory trading is by identifying times when prices
have not updated to account for positive serial correlation in non-HFT order flow.
The final main hypothesis relates to understanding differences between HFTs. Anticipatory
trading requires an HFT to be more skilled than some liquidity providers at learning from order
flow. Additionally, we do not expect different HFTs to follow the same strategies (Boehmer, Li,
and Saar 2018). It follows that anticipatory trading may be concentrated in a subset of the HFTs.
Hypothesis 4 If certain HFTs are better at forecasting order flow or focus more on the strategy,
then trades from these HFTs will be consistently more strongly correlated with future non-HFT
trades than trades from other HFTs.
These hypotheses are not biased by using exclusively NASDAQ data. A finding that HFTs make
marketable purchases and sales immediately before non-HFTs on NASDAQ is true regardless of
what is happening on other exchanges and regardless of the HFTs’ net position across all exchanges.
To reverse this finding across all markets, it would be necessary to find the reverse pattern elsewhere.
But there is no reason to believe NASDAQ is not representative. It was the biggest exchange, market
structure has convergenced to electronic limit order books everywhere, and mostly the same HFTs
and non-HFTs trade on all exchanges.
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2 Data
2.1 Sample construction
This study uses intra-day transactions data from the NASDAQ Stock Market. NASDAQ was the
largest U.S. exchange by volume during the January to December 2009 sample period,7 with a
21.3% share of total volume (NASDAQ 10K 2009). This includes 33.0% of NASDAQ-listed volume
and 15.7% of NYSE-listed volume. Like all exchanges, it is structured as an electronic limit-order
book and executions primarily come from professional traders.8
The 96 sample stocks (48 NASDAQ-listed and 48 NYSE-listed) are randomly selected from a
sample universe representative of the stocks traded by actively managed investment funds. I use
a random sample instead of all common stocks because of computational constraints. The sample
is constructed from single-class CRSP common stocks (share code 10 or 11) at the end of 2008.
I exclude the bottom two NYSE size deciles to approximate common definitions of active funds’
investable universe (e.g., Russell 3000 or MSCI Investable Market 2500). To ensure sample stocks
are fairly liquid, I require greater than $1 million average daily dollar volume in December 2008
and a stock price greater than $5 at the end of 2008. From this sample universe of 1,882 stocks, I
then randomly select 6 NASDAQ-listed and 6 NYSE-listed stocks from each of the eight remaining
size deciles.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all stock days in the sample. The sample averages 93
stocks per trading day.9 Market capitalization ranges from $22 million to $125,331 million. On
average, 27.2% of the stocks’ dollar volume trades on NASDAQ, and this varies little across size
portfolios. Comparing small-caps to mid- and large-caps, as market capitalization increases, there
are increases in median price ($14.77, $25.04, and $31.37 ), median dollar volume ($1.9 million,
$15.5 million, and $120.2 million), and median HFT share of dollar volume (14.8%, 29.2%, and
40.9%).
7I exclude January 27th from the sample, because quote data for NYSE-listed stocks is missing.
8Most retail brokerages have contracts with market making firms who pay for the right to fill retail orders. For
example, in Q3 2009 E*Trade routed nearly all its customers’ market orders and over half its customers’ limit orders to
either Citadel or E*Trade’s market making arms (E*Trade 2009). See Battalio and Loughran (2008) for a discussion
of these relationships.
9 The number of stocks varies for two reasons: first, to ensure tick size does not constrain price movements, stocks
are temporarily removed any day the prior close is less than $1; second, to remove stocks that stop trading due to
bankruptcy or acquisition, stocks are permanently removed from the sample after a day with dollar volume less than
$100,000. These filters use past rather than future data to avoid look-ahead biases.
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2.2 Background on HFTs
The firms typically described as HFTs are trading firms using high-turnover automated strategies.
Examples include Tradebot Systems, Inc., and GETCO. These firms are remarkably active traders.
On their websites, Tradebot says they often account for more than 5% of total U.S. equity trading
volume, and GETCO says they are “among the top 5 participants by volume on many venues”
(Tradebot 2010, GETCO 2010). They are a large part of the market. The TABB Group estimated
HFTs accounted for 61% of U.S. Equity share volume in 2009 (Tabb 2009).
2.3 HFT identification
The NASDAQ trade data classifies firms as either an HFT or a non-HFT. NASDAQ does not
disclose the identities of the HFTs or exact criteria used to determine the classification. This HFT
versus non-HFT classification is the same as in Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014), though
their dataset is different. NASDAQ identifies HFTs using a variety of qualitative and quantitative
criteria. The firms classified as HFTs typically use low-latency connections and trade more actively
than other investors. Their orders have shorter durations than other investors, and they show a
greater tendency to flip between long and short positions in a stock during a day.
A disadvantage of the classification scheme is that it is largely done at the broker level. As a
result, HFT orders routed through the standard trading system of a broker that handles non-HFT
orders, such as Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley, will be misclassified as non-HFT (Brogaard,
Hendershott, and Riordan 2014). This is a concern primarily for HFTs that are internal divisions
of larger investment banks. Independent HFTs who act as their own broker or who use specialist
brokers to co-locate servers and retain direct control of their routing infrastructure should be
classified correctly. Section 4.3 evaluates whether potential misclassification has an important
effect on the empirical results.
2.4 Construction of returns and trade imbalances
I calculate intra-day returns using cleaned bid-ask midpoints from the National Best Bid and Best
Offer (NBBO).10 The NBBO aggregates quotes from all exchanges, so it is the best measure of a
10 The cleaning procedure follows guidelines in Hasbrouck (2010). First, I remove quote updates where the bid
on one exchange is greater than the ask on another. This can be a reporting artifact due to latency or a temporary
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stock’s quoted price.
I use all trades during regular continuous trading hours (no open or closing cross) to con-
struct net marketable buying and net buying imbalances. Marketable trades consist of all liquidity-
removing sides of transactions. Non-marketable trades include all liquidity-providing sides of trans-
actions (both visible and hidden orders). The NASDAQ matching engine makes this marketable/non-
marketable designation when a trade is executed. All orders are limit orders, and a trade is initiated
when someone submits a limit order that crosses the spread. The matching engine marks the order
from the party who initiated the transaction as a marketable order and the other party’s order as
non-marketable.
A net marketable buying imbalance, defined as shares in buyer-initiated trades minus shares
in seller-initiated trades, is a common measure of buying and selling pressure from the existing
literature (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2002). The net buying imbalance is shares
bought minus shares sold and is used to measure position changes of different investor groups. To
put trade imbalances on a similar scale across stocks, I normalize all imbalance measures by a
stock’s 20-day trailing volume from CRSP.
Panel B in Table 1 summarizes trade imbalances for the sample stocks prior to their being
normalized by trailing volume. The table describes the distribution of the stock-day standard de-
viations of HFTs’ net buying, their net marketable buying, and non-HFTs’ net marketable buying.
The mean standard deviation of HFTs’ net buying (HFTNB) for all stock days is 83 shares, com-
pared to 80 shares for their net marketable buying (HFTNMB). These figures are slightly smaller
than the 100 shares that O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014) report as the median trade size on NAS-
DAQ in 2008 and 2009. The average standard deviation of non-HFTs’ net marketable buying
(non-HFTNMB), at 125 shares, is somewhat higher than that of HFTs. The wide variation in im-
arbitrage that gets corrected within fractions of a second. Second, I remove quotes where the bid-ask spread is
more than 20% greater than the bid-ask midpoint. This 20% filter removes rarely occuring stub quotes (e.g., bid at
$0.01 and ask at $20.00) that would cause large fluctuations in the bid-ask midpoint that is not reflective of a true
price change. The 20% relative spread cutoff for what constitutes reasonable quotes comes from the SEC’s initial
single-stock circuit breaker rule. The rule halted stocks after a 10% return in 5 minutes to prevent “clearly erroneous
transactions” (SEC 2010). This is consistent with a 20% relative spread limit, because a stock with successive trades
first at a negligable spread and then at a 20% relative spread (i.e., bid/ask 10% away from prior trade) would trip
the circuit breaker. When an invalid quote is removed due to either filter, I use the last valid midpoint for the price
until a new valid midpoint is available. A new midpoint is typically available within a few milliseconds. To remedy
bad pre-market quotes in the NYSE data, the last of which is used to proxy for the opening price, I throw out the
last price before the open if there is more than a 20% difference between the last pre-open bid-ask midpoint and the
first post-open bid-ask midpoint.
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balance standard deviations between size portfolios motivates the normalization by trailing volume
in later results.
3 Tests of the anticipatory trading hypotheses
This section tests whether HFT trades forecast non-HFT trades and then examines additional
empirical implications of the pattern being caused by anticipatory trading.
Throughout the paper, I use a method similar to Fama and MacBeth (1973) to account for
cross-sectional correlation across stocks and autocorrelation through time. Observations in nearby
seconds are potentially correlated, so they should not be treated as independent. To be conservative,
I collapse all estimates on a day to a single average estimate for that day. This gives me a time-series
of the average effect each day. I then base hypothesis tests on the mean of that daily time series.
In effect, the question I ask is whether the estimate is consistently different from zero throughout
the days in the sample. I do not assume observations from the same day are independent. I only
assume different days are independent. Of course, there is likely some residual correlation between
nearby days, so I use Newey and West t-statistics with the optimal lag length for the daily series
chosen following Newey and West (1994). Despite the conservative approach to standard errors,
many of the tests show high t-statistics. This happens when the estimated effect is consistent across
the days in the sample.
3.1 Do trades from HFTs lead trades from non-HFTs?
Anticipatory trading implies an increase in HFT net marketable buying should forecast an increase
in non-HFT net marketable buying and an increase in returns (Hypothesis 1). The first tests use
portfolio sorts to examine the hypothesized relationships in a simple and easy to interpret form.
Afterward, vector autoregressions (VARs) evaluate whether HFT trading has any predictive power
beyond that of past returns and serial correlation in non-HFT trading.
The sorts identify stocks with large HFT net marketable buying imbalances in a given second.
I then look at non-HFT net marketable buying and returns afterward.
Every stock is assigned to one of ten portfolios each second based on the stock’s HFT net
marketable buying imbalance. Portfolio breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations
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during the prior trading day. Then, a daily mean of the variable of interest for each portfolio is
calculated by taking an average among all stock-second observations for the portfolio that day:
Vd,p =
1
Np
∑
i,t
Vd,p,i,t,
where V is the variable of interest, d indexes days, p indexes portfolios, Np is the number of stock-
second observations in the portfolio that day, i indexes stocks, and t indexes seconds. Hypothesis
tests are based on the means of these daily time series.
Figure 1 plots cumulative net marketable buying for sort deciles ten (stocks HFTs bought)
and one (stocks HFTs sold). Because the figure plots cumulative values, positive net marketable
buying causes the line in that second to rise, while negative net marketable buying causes the line
to fall. The dark red lines indicate HFTs’ cumulative net marketable buying plotted on the left
y-axis. Looking at the stocks HFTs buy, HFT net marketable buying is slightly positive before
the sort, spikes in the sort period, and then is relatively flat afterwards. The sort-period spike is
expected, because the line is the cumulative value of the variable used to form the portfolios. The
real question is what happens to non-HFT net marketable buying afterward.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Figure 1 shows that in the seconds after these sorts on HFT net
marketable buying, non-HFT net marketable buying is positive for the stocks HFTs bought and
negative for the stocks HFTs sold. Cumulative non-HFT net marketable buying is depicted by
dashed blue lines plotted on the right y-axis. In the seconds after the sort, cumulative non-HFT
net marketable buying for the stocks HFTs bought steadily increases. This indicates consistently
more marketable purchases than sales—non-HFTs buy the stocks HFTs previously bought. HFTs
also buy shares after the sort, but in comparison to non-HFTs, they buy relatively more in the sort
second than afterward.
Table 2 presents this sort data in a form conducive to hypothesis tests. Panel A shows that
in the first thirty seconds after the sort, cumulative non-HFT net marketable buying rises to 0.65
times the one-second standard deviation (or 27 shares for the median stock). Over the next four
and a half minutes, it continues rising to 1.15 (or 48 shares for the median stock). These values
are both significantly different from zero, with t-statistics of 14.35 and 2.41. The picture for the
stocks HFTs sold most aggressively is symmetric; non-HFT net marketable buying in decile one is
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−0.69 and −1.89 times the one-second standard deviation in the first 30 seconds and the first five
minutes after the sort respectively.
If the order flow patterns in Figure 1 and Table 2 are due to HFTs anticipating non-HFT
buying and selling, then we should also see that the stocks HFTs bought aggressively have positive
future returns and the stocks they sold have negative future returns. Figure 2 shows that in the 30
seconds after the sort, prices of stocks in HFT net marketable buying decile ten increase by 1.23
basis points, while the prices of decile one stocks decline by −1.07 basis points. Table 2B shows
both portfolios’ returns are significantly different from zero, with t-statistics of 11.78 and −13.48.
These price changes will be permanent if HFTs anticipate order flow from informed traders and
temporary if they anticipate liquidity traders (Hypothesis 2). The last two columns in Table 2B
show partial reversal of these returns over the next four and a half minutes. Decile ten reverses
from 1.23 basis points 30 seconds after the sort to 0.57 basis points five minutes afterwards; decile
one reverses from −1.07 to −0.58 basis points. Nonetheless, the return spread between these two
portfolios remains positive. This is consistent with Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan’s (2014)
findings, using a state-space model, that HFT marketable trades forecast permanent price changes.
Thus, the evidence is more consistent with HFTs anticipating informed rather than uninformed
order flow.
Figure 3 examines who provides liquidity to these marketable HFT trades. In Panel A, stocks
are sorted into deciles by HFT net marketable buying the same as in Figure 1. The only difference is
that I now plot cumulative HFT net buying, which aggregates both marketable and non-marketable
trades. A comparison of net marketable buying to net buying reveals who provides liquidity. For
example, if one HFT uses a marketable order to purchase 100 shares from another HFT, then net
marketable buying across the two HFTs is 100 shares. But net buying is 0, because the first HFT’s
purchase and the second’s sale cancel each other out.
Panel A shows that HFTs in aggregate take liquidity from non-HFTs in these sorts. In the sort
second, net buying for decile ten rises by 5.77, while it falls by 5.83 for decile one. Averaging the two
and multiplying by its median one-second standard deviation (28 shares) gives an average 162 share
net position change for either decile. The equivalent calculation for HFTs’ net marketable buying
in Figure 1 gives a 213 share net marketable imbalance
(8.19+8.21
2 ×26
)
. Therefore, 24% of the net
liquidity provision comes from HFTs
(213−162
213
)
and 76% comes from non-HFTs. This compares to
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HFTs’ 37% share of liquidity provision by dollar volume in the sample. The evidence is consistent
with HFT liquidity providers stepping away, leaving less-skilled non-HFT liquidity providers to fill
informed HFT orders. Panel B explores differences between HFTs, which I defer until Section 3.4.
The sorts provide a few additional insights. First, the order flow and return results are stronger
in small-cap stocks. In the first 30 seconds after the sort, the difference between non-HFT net
marketable buying for the stocks HFTs bought (decile ten) versus sold (decile one) is 2.66 for
small-cap stocks, compared to 1.34 for all stocks. Similarly, the decile ten minus decile one return
spread is 5.18 basis points for small-cap stocks, compared to 2.30 for all stocks. Both effects persist
through five minutes after the sort. The larger post-sort spread in smaller stocks could be due
to non-HFTs having a harder time disguising order flow when trading relatively illiquid stocks.
Section 3.5 examines this illiquidity hypothesis in more detail. Second, stocks HFTs buy with
marketable orders have higher returns the prior 30 seconds (4.43 basis points) than the stocks
they sell (−4.30 basis points). The trend chasing is notable, because HFTs are often characterized
as liquidity providers. But this pattern is more consistent with these trades demanding liquidity
than providing it. Third, that HFT trades predict non-HFT trades at horizons much longer than
a second shows the result is not an artifact of cross-market arbitrage. This type of arbitrage is
understood to occur at sub-second horizons (see Budish, Cramton, and Shim 2015).
Table 3 builds on the sort results using a vector autoregression (VAR) similar to Hasbrouck
(1991). The portfolio sorts show evidence of positive serial correlation and trend-chasing in non-
HFT net marketable buying. These effects provide a simple way for an HFT to predict non-HFT
trades. The VAR isolates the predictive ability of HFTs’ marketable trades in excess of anything
coming from these simple signals.
The VAR is a system of three equations in which lags of returns, HFT net marketable buying,
and non-HFT net marketable buying are all used to explain each other:
Rt =α1+
10∑
i=1
γ1,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β1,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ1,iRt−i +²1,t (1)
HFTNMB,t =α2+
10∑
i=1
γ2,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β2,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ2,iRt−i +²2,t (2)
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
10∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t (3)
where Rt is the one-second NBBO midpoint return, HFTNMB,t is the one-second HFT net mar-
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ketable buying, and non-HFTNMB,t is the one-second non-HFT net marketable buying. The equa-
tions are estimated for each stock every day. All variables are standardized by their standard
deviation among all stocks that day. Table 3 averages all stocks’ coefficients on the same day
and then reports significance tests based on the mean of the resulting daily time series (Fama and
MacBeth 1973).
The main question is whether HFT net marketable buying is still positively correlated with
future non-HFT net marketable buying and returns. Table 3 shows both positive correlations
still exists in the VAR. In the equation forecasting non-HFT net marketable buying, the lag one
coefficient on HFT net marketable buying is 0.0007, rising to 0.0021 at lag two and then declining
slowly to 0.0016 at lag ten. Though the first lag coefficient is the smallest, they are all significantly
different from zero, and the decay in predictability from lags two to ten is slow. Similarly, in
the equation forecasting returns, a one-standard deviation increase in HFT net marketable buying
leads to a 0.0185 standard deviation increase in the next second’s return, with a t-statistic of 10.92.
Coefficients remain positive and significantly different from zero up through the ninth lag.
A related question is whether HFT trades predict non-HFT trades better than non-HFT trades
predict HFT trades. If HFTs learn about order flow from past trades, then there will be some
correlation between past non-HFT trades and future HFT trades. However, the evidence for HFTs
trading ahead of predicted order flow is strongest if HFT trading predicts non-HFT trading more
strongly than non-HFT trading predicts HFT trading.11
Table 3 shows HFT net marketable buying does in fact predict non-HFT net marketable buying
more strongly than the reverse. The lag one coefficients at first seem to contradict this statement; in
the HFT forecasting equation, the coefficient on non-HFT net marketable buying is bigger (0.0028)
than the HFT coefficient in the non-HFT forecasting equation (0.0007). However, this flips at
higher lags. Putting all ten lags together, the non-HFT coefficients sum to -0.005 when predicting
HFT net marketable buying, compared to a sum of 0.016 for the HFT coefficients when predicting
non-HFT net marketable buying.
This section evaluated lead-lag relationships between HFT and non-HFT net marketable buying
11Note that HFTs do not need to trade earlier than non-HFTs to profit from figuring out what the non-HFTs will
be buying or selling (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005). For instance, if an HFT learns that informed non-HFTs are
buying a stock, the HFT can buy the stock at the same time as the informed non-HFTs. In this scenario, the HFT is
profiting from anticipating informed non-HFT order flow, but they are not necessarily trading before the non-HFTs.
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using portfolio sorts and VARs. Both sets of tests show an increase in HFT net marketable buying
is followed by an increase in non-HFT net marketable buying and returns. The effects are strongest
in small-cap stocks and consistent with HFTs anticipating informed order flow.
3.2 Example patterns HFTs could use to predict order flow
This section provides insight into the types of patterns that allow HFTs to infer non-HFT order
flow. There are many possibilities, and an exhaustive search is not feasible. However, Table 4
provides two illustrative examples that predict non-HFT trading and returns. In practice, I expect
HFTs to use sophisticated machine-learning algorithms. But I use simple rule-based sorts so that
they are easy to interpret.
Both patterns are based on the idea of finding times when a stock’s price has not fully adjusted
to persistent non-HFT order flow (Hypothesis 3). This type of pattern is consistent with Figure 1,
which showed HFT marketable buying spike near the start of a period of persistent non-HFT
marketable buying. To implement the test, stocks are sorted into Buy and Sell portfolios at the
end of second t based on non-HFT net marketable buying (non-HFTNMB) and returns (R) from
seconds t−5 to t−1. Waiting until the end of second t to do the sort ensures an HFT would
have up to a second between observing the sort variables and making a trading decision. The
only difference between the two patterns is the thresholds used to identify serial correlation in lag
non-HFT order flow. To form the Buy portfolio, the first pattern requires non-HFTNMB,t−1 > 0 and∑5
l=1 non-HFTNMB,t−l > 2. The second requires non-HFTNMB,t−1 > 1 and
∑5
l=1 non-HFTNMB,t−l >
HFTNMB,t−1. They both then require
∏5
l=1 (1+Rt−l)−1≥ 0 and Rt−1 = 0 to mark times the price
is slow to update to non-HFT order flow at t−1. Restrictions for identifying the Sell portfolio are
the same but with signs and inequalities flipped.
Table 4 shows the two patterns are both successful in predicting higher non-HFT net marketable
buying and higher returns for the Buy portfolio than the Sell portfolio. For the first pattern, Panel
A shows that the first 30 seconds after the sort, the Buy−Sell portfolio difference is 5.43 for non-
HFT net marketable buying and 3.32 basis points for returns. Panel B shows these differences for
the second pattern are 8.44 for non-HFT net marketable buying and 3.35 basis points for returns.
In both cases, the differences are significantly different from zero and widen through five minutes
after the sort.
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These findings indicate they are feasible patterns HFTs could use to predict order flow and
returns. Additionally, in both panels HFT net marketable buying is higher for the Buy portfolio
than for the Sell portfolio in the seconds surrounding the sort. This is consistent with the patterns
capturing non-HFT predictability that HFTs actually use.
3.3 How is non-HFT price impact affected by anticipatory trading?
An HFT able to anticipate a non-HFT’s trades will compete with that non-HFT to obtain execu-
tions. This increases the non-HFT’s price impact, because for every 100 shares they trade, there
is the direct impact of those 100 shares plus the impact of competing HFT trades. I estimate the
effect of this competition using a structural VAR (Hasbrouck 1991). This allows me to estimate the
price impact of a 100 share shock to non-HFT net marketable buying. I then provide a comparison
to price impact at times when there is no competition from HFTs. The comparison gives an esti-
mate of the additional price impact from HFTs’ anticipatory trades. Albeit with the caveat that
identification comes from the structural specification rather than from use of an instrument that
specifically identifies times HFTs are not engaged in anticipatory trading. The estimate implies
competition from HFTs raises non-HFT price impact by about 14%. The results are in Figure 4.
Like the VAR used elsewhere in the paper, the price impact VAR has an equation for returns
(R), for non-HFT net marketable buying (non-HFTNMB), and for HFT net marketable buying
(HFTNMB). And the regressions include lags of all three as explanatory variables. But the price
impact VAR includes additional terms to capture contemporaneous price impact and competition.
First, all equations include lags of a competition variable (C). When HFT and non-HFT net
marketable buying are both positive or both negative, they are competing for the same liquidity.
At these times, the competition variable is Ct = sign
(
HFTNMB,t
)× ∣∣HFTNMB,t∣∣× ∣∣non-HFTNMB,t∣∣
(the sign term makes it positive for purchases and negative for sales). Otherwise Ct = 0. Second,
the return equation includes contemporaneous values of HFT trading, non-HFT trading, and the
competition variable. This captures the effect of time t trades on time t returns. Third, the HFT
equation contains contemporaneous non-HFT trading as an explanatory variable. The intuition
for this timing is that HFTs submit anticipatory trades in second t based on their expectation of
what non-HFT order flow will be that second. It is important to account for this within-period
correlation if HFTs and non-HFTs compete to trade on the same signal.
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The impulse response function for returns measures price impact. It shows the cumulative effect
on returns of a 100 share shock to non-HFT net marketable buying. The lagged variables in the
VAR control for heterogeneity before the shock. I estimate two impulse response functions. The
first shows non-HFT price impact using the full VAR, which incorporates the effect of competing
with HFTs. The second is an estimate for a counterfactual world with no HFT competition. It sets
HFTNMB in every second to zero and measures price impact if non-HFTNMB each second after
the shock is the same as in the first scenario. With a 10-lag VAR, Figure 4 shows the estimated
non-HFT price impact when competing with HFTs is 0.281 basis points the second of the shock,
accumulating to 0.846 basis points after 30 seconds. The estimate from the counterfactual with no
HFTs is 0.274 basis points the second of the shock and 0.743 basis points 30 seconds later. The
difference between the two estimates is statistically significant by the first second after the shock.
It implies HFT competition raises the price impact of non-HFT net marketable buying by 14%
(= 0.846/0.743−1). I also extended the VAR to 30 lags, and the implied effect of competition was
still around 14% (1.130/0.994−1).
3.4 Is predicting order flow related to HFT skill?
This section tests first whether some HFTs are better at predicting order flow (Hypothesis 4). It
then examines if the HFTs who predict order flow the best are also better at predicting returns.
The first task is to identify the HFTs who are the best at predicting order flow.
I use regressions similar to the non-HFT forecasting regression in Table 3. The difference here
is the regression is estimated separately for each HFT in the sample. There are two regression
estimates for each HFT every day. In the first, the HFT variable is the HFT’s net marketable
buying. In the second, the HFT variable is the HFT’s net buying. HFT net buying is more
applicable here than in the aggregate results, because these estimates are calculated for each HFT
separately. As a result, we do not have to worry that variation in net buying by HFTs anticipating
order flow is obscured by variation in net buying caused by different HFTs providing liquidity. The
heading for Table 5 contains the regression equation.
High-frequency traders’ ability to predict buying and selling pressure is measured in two ways:
first, by the average coefficient on the first lag of the HFT’s net marketable buying or net buying,
and second by the average sum of the coefficients on all ten lags of their net marketable buying or
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net buying. I take the mean of each ability measure across all days in a month for each HFT and
sort the sample into three groups based on the magnitude of the HFTs’ ability measures. I define
the HFTs who are skilled at predicting order flow as those with the largest positive coefficients.
One simple way to look at consistency is to look at the probability an HFT in the highest
correlation group remains in that group in future months. Figure 5 plots the probability an HFT
who is in the highest-correlation group will again be in the highest-correlation group one, two, and
three months later. There are three groups, so under the null hypothesis of no persistent difference
among HFTs, only 33.3% of the HFTs should still be in the highest-correlation group one month
after the sort. In fact, for all sort methods, between 57% and 72% of the HFTs are still in the
highest-correlation group one month later. Similarly, in months two and three, more HFTs are still
in the high group than would be the expectation under the null hypothesis of no persistence.
Another way to examine persistence is to compare post-sort month coefficients for the three
HFT groups. Table 5 reports post-sort month coefficients for these groups. The left set of columns
is for when the HFT variable is net marketable buying, and the right set is for when the HFT
variable is net buying. The top group of rows examines the persistence of the coefficient on the first
lag of the HFT variable, γd,t,1. When the HFT variable is net marketable buying, the average γd,t,1
for the highest-correlation group is 0.024, compared to -0.005 for the lowest-correlation group. Both
the Newey and West (1994) p-value and non-parametric rank sum p-value indicate this difference
is significantly different from zero. The left group of columns in the middle rows of Table 5 show
results using ten lags of HFTs’ net marketable buying. As was the case for the test using just the
first lag, the difference between the highest and lowest-correlation groups is significantly different
from zero. The right group of columns in Table 5 report tests using HFTs’ net buying. Results from
these tests are the same as for the net marketable buying tests. Finally, the bottom rows show the
sum of HFT coefficients when the VAR is extended to 30 lags, and the results are similar. Whether
one looks at coefficients on the first lag, first ten lags, or first 30 lags of HFT net marketable buying
or net buying, there are persistent differences between the highest and lowest-correlation HFT
groups. These results indicate that some HFTs’ trades are consistently more strongly correlated
with future non-HFT order flow.
Having split HFTs into groups, I revisit the question of who provides liquidity to HFTs’ mar-
ketable trades when they buy or sell a stock aggressively. Prior results aggregating all HFTs showed
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that liquidity mostly came from non-HFTs. But perhaps certain HFTs are consistently on the other
side of these trades. Panel B in Figure 3 examines cumulative HFT net buying with HFTs split
by the coefficient on the first lag of their net marketable buying in the 10-lag regression. The
sort is now on net marketable buying aggregated among HFTs in the High group. If HFTs in the
Mid or Low groups consistently provide liquidity to the High HFTs, then their net buying should
be negative in the second when High HFTs are buying stocks with marketable orders. However,
Mid and Low group HFTs are actually slight net buyers in the sort second when High HFTs buy
aggressively (and vice versa for the Sell portfolio).
Next, Table 6 examines whether marketable trades from HFTs who are skilled at predicting
order flow (those in the High group) also forecast larger returns. HFTs are again split into three
groups using the methodology from Table 5. Then, trades are aggregated among HFTs in each
group, resulting in one time-series of aggregated trades for each HFT group. Returns are then
alternately regressed on ten lags of each aggregate HFT series, controlling for ten lags of returns
and non-HFT net marketable buying. Thus, the regressions identify the HFT groups’ ability to
forecast returns that is independent of information in past returns and non-HFT order flow. For
brevity, I only report results for the split on the first lag of HFT net marketable buying in the
10-lag regression.
The results indicate marketable trades from HFTs who are skilled at predicting order flow are
better at predicting returns. Coefficients on the first three lags of HFT net marketable buying in the
High HFT regressions are 0.0328, 0.0210, and 0.0160, compared to 0.0268, 0.0160, and 0.0125 in the
Low group. Both the means and medians of the two coefficient time-series are significantly different
from each other, as are the differences in the sum of all 10 lags. These findings are consistent with
HFTs in the High group being more skilled at predicting short-term returns.
3.5 Are non-HFTs’ trades more predictable when they are impatient?
Non-HFTs have an incentive to disguise their order flow from HFTs. But as the ITG quote on
page 3 highlighted, there is a tradeoff between disguising order flow and trading a large position
quickly. It follows that non-HFT order flow may be more predictable when they are impatient. This
section tests the hypothesis by comparing VAR estimates from normal times to estimates from times
when non-HFTs are hypothesized to be impatient. The VAR is the same as in Section 3.1. I focus
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on the equation where the dependent variable is non-HFT net marketable buying. If HFTs are
doing relatively more anticipatory trading, then I expect larger positive coefficients on the lagged
HFT imbalance variables. I examine several times when I expect non-HFTs to be impatient: at
the market open and close, on days with high volume or high trade imbalances, and when trading
illiquid stocks.
A non-HFT may be impatient at the open if they received an overnight signal (e.g., news) and
are concerned other investors either already have or will soon receive the same signal. Similarly,
investors near the close may have private information about an end-of-day news announcement. Or
they may be facing a liquidity shock that needs to be funded before the close. I use the first and
last half hour of the trading day as the opening and close periods. The control period is the rest of
the day.
High volume or imbalance days are likely days when certain investors are trading large positions.
And it is harder to hide with noise traders when trading a large position. Thus I compare stock
days with high volume or a high value of the absolute net marketable buying imbalance to other
days. Inspired by Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), I classify a day as high volume or high
imbalance if the volume/imbalance is among the top 10% of days the past month (i.e., rank relative
to prior 19 trading days is 19 or 20).
The motivation for examining illiquid stocks is similar to the intuition for volume and imbal-
ances. If non-HFTs do not perfectly scale position sizes relative to liquidity, then in illiquid stocks,
their trades will be proportionately larger and thus harder to hide. I identify illiquid stocks as
those with wide bid-ask spreads or wide relative spreads (=Bid-Ask Spread÷Bid-Ask Midpoint).
Relative spreads account for a $0.01 spread implying different levels of liquidity for a $10 stock and
a $100 stock.
Table 7 shows that non-HFT trade predictability is reliably stronger at the market open, on
high volume days, and in illiquid stocks. Both the coefficient on the first lag of HFT net marketable
buying and the sum of all ten lag coefficients are significantly higher at these times non-HFTs are
expected to be impatient. For comparison, the sum of all ten lag coefficients is 0.0076 higher at the
open than during the middle of the day, 0.0086 higher on high-volume days than other days, 0.0087
higher in stocks with wide versus narrow quoted spreads, and 0.0046 higher in stocks with wide
versus narrow relative spreads. On high imbalance days, the first and sum of all ten coefficients are
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also higher than other days, but the t-statistics for the differences with other days are not quite as
strong (2.13 and 2.10). The one test that does not go as predicted is the test examining trading
near the close. Predictability near the close is weaker than the middle of the day, perhaps because
HFTs do not want to build an inventory position they cannot unwind before the end of the day.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with HFTs having an easier time anticipating order flow when
non-HFTs are more constrained when trying to disguise their trades.
4 Alternative explanations
While the anticipatory trading hypothesis predicts that HFT liquidity demand will be positively
correlated with future non-HFT liquidity demand, there are other possible explanations. Any signal
that HFTs and non-HFTs separately observe and then trade on could result in HFT liquidity
demand positively forecasting non-HFT liquidity demand, particularly if HFTs react faster. This
contrasts with anticipatory trading, in which the HFT does not directly observe the same signal as
the non-HFT but instead infers it from the non-HFT’s trading activity.
It is difficult to completely rule out this alternative, because it is not possible to fully examine
all inputs to HFT and non-HFT trading processes. Nevertheless, if the relation between HFT and
non-HFT trading is still strong after accounting for the most likely signals they would both utilize
in close succession, then it makes this correlated signal explanation less probable. To examine the
issue, this section explores the two most likely signals HFTs and non-HFTs could both be reacting
to: news and past returns. It then evaluates whether the results could be caused by another
correlated signal explanation—trader misclassification.
4.1 Are HFTs simply reacting faster to news?
Reacting to news faster than other investors is an important HFT skill and plausible explanation
for HFT marketable trades leading non-HFT marketable trades (Ye, Yao, and Gai 2013, Foucault,
Hombert, and Rosu 2016).
Alternative Hypothesis 1 If HFT trades lead non-HFT trades because HFTs are reacting faster
to firm news, then the lead-lag relationship should go away after excluding days with firm news.
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News days are identified using a comprehensive set of events: days when an article about the firm
is published, an analyst covering it changes their earnings forecast or investment recommendation,
management provides new guidance, the firm files an SEC Form 8-K indicating a material event,
or the absolute value of the stock’s market-adjusted return is large. The news articles come from
Factiva, data for analysts and guidance from Thomson IBES unadjusted detail files, and 8-Ks from
the SEC EDGAR website.12 The news article, analyst, guidance, and 8-K events cover the most
plausible public news signals HFTs and non-HFTs would both observe. Factiva for example contains
articles from over 35,000 sources, including most major newswires, newspapers, and magazines such
as The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones Newswire, and Reuters.13 Nonetheless,
it is possible HFTs and non-HFTs respond to a signal that is not in one of these databases. The
return-based news day measure addresses this concern. If there is an unobserved news event, trading
on the signal will affect the stock price. Thus, examining trading after excluding days with absolute
market-adjusted returns greater than relatively small thresholds (1%, 0.5%, and 0.25%) minimizes
the chance any observed pattern is caused by unobserved news events.
Table 8 tests the news hypothesis using the Table 3 VAR estimated on days when there is no
news about the firm. The table shows the positive correlation between non-HFT and lagged HFT
net marketable buying still exists after excluding news days.
The first row shows estimates for the full sample, while subsequent rows show the effects of
excluding various types of news days. For the news article, analyst, guidance, and 8-K events,
the table shows results excluding the news day and also from five days before to five days after
the event. The extended +/− 5-day window excludes days that might be contaminated if the news
leaks through private channels before or after the official announcement. The extended window is
unneccessary for the return tests, because the return filter already excludes days with information
leakage regardless the proximity to public news announcements.
In the Factiva exclusion tests, all coefficients on lagged HFT trading are positive and significant.
Additionally, the sum of the first ten lag coefficients is not significantly different from the full sample.
In the IBES, 8-K, and return exclusion tests, the first lag coefficients are not significantly
different from zero. However, coefficients on lags two and three and the sum of the first 10 are all
12See the SEC website for events that trigger 8-Ks. Data is from Phua, Tham, and Wei (2018).
13 Sample firms are matched to articles using IDs Factiva embeds in articles. See Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and
Macskassy (2008) and Gurun and Butler (2012) for evidence on the information content of Factiva articles.
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positive and significant. The sum of the first 10 lag coefficients is smaller than the full sample for
some of these tests. But the test with the biggest difference is still within 25% of the full-sample
estimate.
The final test is the most restrictive. It excludes any day meeting any of the news day definitions.
When only the actual news day is removed, coefficients on all three individual lags and the sum of
the first ten are all positive and significant. The version using the +/− 5-day window is extremely
restrictive, removing all but 835 of the 23,071 stock days in the full sample. With the extended
window, the coefficients on the first three lags are positive, though only the second is significantly
different from zero. Looking at the sum of the first ten coefficients provides more power in the
limited sample. This sum is positive and significantly different from zero, and the difference with
the full sample is not significantly different from zero.
These results show HFT net marketable buying still positively forecasts non-HFT net marketable
buying on days without news.
4.2 Is the explanation non-HFTs and HFTs both chase price trends?
Another hypothesis for why HFT trading leads non-HFT trading is that non-HFT trading has a sim-
ple predictable relationship with past returns. Section 3.1 showed HFTs and non-HFTs both chase
short-term price trends with their marketable trades. It is possible HFT trades predict non-HFT
trades because they are both reacting to lagged returns, except HFTs react faster. Additionally,
with non-HFTs following trend-chasing strategies, another possibility is purchases by HFTs could
cause future non-HFT buying through their effect on returns.
Alternative Hypothesis 2 If HFT net marketable buying leads non-HFT net marketable buying
because non-HFTs chase past price trends, then there should be no correlation between HFT and
non-HFT trading after controlling for lagged returns.
This alternative hypothesis is addressed by the VAR in Table 3. The coefficients in regressions of
non-HFT net marketable buying on HFT net marketable buying are positive controlling for lagged
returns. HFT trades may cause some non-HFT trend chasing through their effect on returns, but
it is not sufficient to explain the lead-lag correlation between HFT and non-HFT trading.
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4.3 Are HFT trades forecasting misclassified HFT trades rather than true non-
HFT trades?
Finally, it is possible HFT trading predicts non-HFT trading because some HFT trades are misclas-
sified. Misclassification can occur if an HFT routes orders through brokers that handle non-HFT
orders, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan 2014).
The problem with misclassification is that HFT trading is serially correlated. This serial correlation
could be caused by some HFTs being slower or by trade splitting. Either way, if you take some of
these later HFT trades and throw them into the non-HFT bucket, then current HFT trading will
forecast those later misclassified trades. Consequently, misclassification could lead to an erroneous
conclusion that HFT trades were forecasting non-HFT trades.
To see how HFT trades would forecast misclassified trades, you can look at how HFT trading
forecasts itself. If correctly classified HFT trades are representative of misclassified trades, then the
predictability of correctly classified trades should be proportional to that of misclassified trades. For
example, a 100 share purchase by correctly classified HFTs might forecast that correctly classified
HFTs purchase 20 shares 5 seconds from now and 10 shares 10 seconds from now. If misclassified
trade predictability is proportional, then misclassified HFTs might purchase half those amounts 5
and 10 seconds from now. The essential idea is that the decay in predictability will be approximately
the same. Importantly, the above hypothesis can be true even if correctly classified trades are not
entirely representative of misclassified ones. It is only necessary that the later correctly classified
HFT trades that generate the serial correlation are representative of later misclassified trades.
We can make additional predictions under the assumption that most HFT trades are correctly
classified. This is a reasonable assumption given NASDAQ attributes roughly 40% of its dollar
volume to the HFTs they identified. If correctly classified HFT trades account for the majority of
HFT trades, then HFT trading should predict itself more than it predicts non-HFT trading. This
is because misclassification implies non-HFT trading is a noisy HFT proxy, so lead-lag correlations
should be attenuated relative to a sample with no noise (i.e., the correctly classified HFT trades).
Alternative Hypothesis 3a Misclassification implies the decay in the correlation between non-
HFT trading and lagged HFT trading is proportional to the decay in the correlation between HFT
trading and lagged values of itself.
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Alternative Hypothesis 3b Misclassification implies HFT trading should forecast itself more
strongly than non-HFT trading.
Figure 6 tests the misclassification hypotheses by comparing the VAR coefficients on HFT net
marketable buying in Table 3. The dark red line plots coefficients from the regression where the
dependent variable is HFT net marketable buying, while the light blue line is for the regression
where the dependent variable is non-HFT net marketable buying. The VAR regression coefficients
are standardized, so to facilitate comparison they are transformed to show the number of shares
change in the dependent variable for a 100 share change in HFT net marketable buying.14 The
y-axis is capped to zoom in on higher lags.
First, the figure shows the decay of the HFT to lagged HFT correlation is faster than the decay of
the non-HFT to lagged HFT correlation. Using the VAR with 10 lags, Panel A shows coefficients for
the first few lags are much higher when HFT net marketable buying is the dependent variable (dark
red lines) than when non-HFT net marketable buying is the dependent variable (light blue lines).
However, as the lags increase, the coefficients when HFT net marketable buying is the dependent
variable drop steadily, while the coefficients when non-HFT net marketable buying is the dependent
variable remain comparatively stable. This finding contradicts Alternative Hypotheses 3a.
Second, HFT net marketable buying predicts non-HFT net marketable buying better than
itself at higher lags. This conflicts with Alternative Hypothesis 3b. Specifically, after seven lags,
the HFT coefficient is actually bigger in the regression where the dependent variable is non-HFT net
marketable buying. The coefficients in Panel A imply a 100 share increase in HFT net marketable
buying ten seconds ago is associated with a 0.066 share increase in HFT net marketable buying,
compared to a 0.244 share increase in non-HFT net marketable buying. Using the VAR with 30
lags, Panel B shows the coefficient in the HFT regression is roughly zero by the fifteenth lag, while
the coefficient in the non-HFT regression remains positive and significantly different from zero even
after 30 lags.
These findings are inconsistent with the misclassification explanation. The simpler explanation
is that HFT marketable trades are mostly forecasting correctly classified non-HFT marketable
14 For example, the lag 1 HFT coefficient in the non-HFT regression in Table 3 is 0.0007. Table 1 shows the mean
standard deviations of HFTNMB (80) and non-HFTNMB (125). The coefficient in terms of a 100 share change in
HFT net marketable buying is 0.0007×125×100/80=0.1
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trades, especially when looking 10 seconds or more into the future.
5 Relation to inventory management
Order anticipation typically comes up in the context of speculation. But being able to anticipate
order flow is also useful for HFT market makers managing their inventory risk. Consider a market
making HFT who acquires a short position in a stock by selling to liquidity demanding non-HFT
buyers. If the HFT subsequently realizes these non-HFT purchases will continue and push prices
up, then the HFT can avoid a loss by exiting the short position quickly with a marketable buy
order. In this scenario, the HFT buys ahead of non-HFTs to get out of a losing position.
Inventory management and speculation have different implications for how HFTs’ marketable
buying is related to existing positions. Marketable trades that reverse existing positions are consis-
tent with inventory management.15 Speculation is consistent with the other leg of a marketable pur-
chase occuring beforehand or afterwards, though a common expectation is to see a non-marketable
sale afterward.
The NASDAQ data does not contain position information. But HFT positions can be estimated
by cumulating their net buying across all NASDAQ trades. A downside to this method is that
relying on data from a single exchange means it misses position changes caused by trades on other
venues (Menkveld 2013, Reiss and Werner 1998). In particular, if an HFT purchases a share of GE
on NASDAQ and sells the share on the NYSE, they will appear to be long one share of GE in the
NASDAQ data when they actually have no position. Nevertheless, the estimates are informative.
Figure 3 Panel A plots cumulative HFT net buying for the first and tenth net marketable
buying decile portfolios. The portfolios are the same as in Figure 1, except the plotted variable is
net buying instead of net marketable buying.
If HFTs’ marketable purchases in the sort period are unwinding short inventory positions ac-
cumulated over the prior 30 seconds, then the solid line indicating cumulative net buying for decile
ten (stocks HFTs buy aggressively in second 0) should be falling in the pre-sort period. However,
net buying for decile 10 is slightly increasing in the 30 seconds before the sort. Similarly, inventory
management implies the dotted line showing cumulative net buying for decile one (stocks HFTs sell
15For research on inventory management by NYSE specialists, see Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Hendershott
and Seasholes (2008), and Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010).
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aggressively) should be rising in the pre-sort period. Instead, it is slightly declining. Looking at net
buying after the sort, we also see no evidence of position reversal there. Therefore, in expectation
the other leg of the sort-period trades occurs on NASDAQ more than 30 seconds before or after
the sort or on another venue.
This test shows no evidence HFT trades in the sort period dispose of inventory positions pre-
viously acquired on NASDAQ. It is possible they are disposing of inventory acquired on another
exchange. An HFT might sell to liquidity demanding non-HFTs on the NYSE and then, realizing
non-HFT buying will continue and push the price up, turn around and buy the shares back on
NASDAQ. However, this scenario still implies the HFT correctly predicts the non-HFT’s order
flow, trades ahead of it to increase their profits, and is taking liquidity the non-HFT would have
otherwise accessed. It is still anticipatory trading.
That said, the evidence is more consistent with a speculative trading interpretation. Marketable
trades are too large a share of HFT volume to be primarily inventory management. They account
for over half of HFT dollar volume in the sample and, since they pay the bid-ask spread and take
fee, market makers want to minimize their use (Harris 2002). Consequently, it is probable a lot of
the variation in marketable trades is from non-market making strategies. Speculation is also more
consistent with HFT trades predicting non-HFT trades more strongly early in the day (Table 7).
Market makers like to end the day with minimal inventory positions. Therefore, if the results are
caused by HFTs exiting inventory positions, the effect should be stronger (not weaker) at the end
of the day. Stronger results in small-cap stocks (Table 2) is also less consistent with inventory
management, because these are the stocks in which HFT market making is least prevalent (Yao
and Ye 2018).
While an implied holding period longer than a few seconds contradicts some notions of high-
frequency trading, it is perhaps important to distinguish between holding periods of market making
and speculative strategies. To this point, the HFT Hudson River Trading told the Wall Street
Journal it trades 5% of U.S. volume using both market making and speculative strategies, with
60% of their strategies taking liquidity (Hope 2014). Their average holding period was about five
minutes and positions held overnight commonly accounted for 25% of firm capital. Thus, holding
periods of more than a few seconds are not unusual. Hudson River explicitly states in the article
they “... don’t try to race ahead of an insitution’s order ...” Nonetheless, for some subset of HFTs,
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the evidence in this paper shows those HFTs’ marketable trades do just that.
6 Conclusion
This study examines whether HFTs anticipate and then trade ahead of other investors’ order flow.
I find that if HFTs on net buy a stock with marketable orders during a particular second, then
non-HFTs will subsequently buy this same stock with marketable orders. This forecasted non-HFT
net marketable buying continues for at least five minutes after the sort second. I explore several
explanations for these findings, including them being driven by HFTs reacting faster to news, non-
HFTs chasing return trends, and trader misclassification. However, the findings are best explained
by HFTs learning which stocks non-HFTs will be buying or selling and then trading ahead of that
order flow and its associated price impact.
Consistent with this anticipatory trading hypothesis, the effects are stronger at times when
non-HFTs may be impatient, such as at the market open, on high volume days, and in stocks with
wide bid-ask spreads. I also find evidence consistent with HFTs varying in their skill at predicting
non-HFT order flow, and that trades from HFTs who are the most skilled at predicting order
flow predict larger price changes. These findings provide evidence supporting the existence of an
anticipatory trading channel through which HFTs increase non-HFT trading costs.
A primary reason for interest in research on HFTs is to understand their effect on other market
participants. Likely benefits from HFTs acting as hyper-efficient market makers include lower bid-
ask spreads and reduced return reversals. It is harder to get a handle on the costs HFTs impose on
others. This study takes a step in that direction by providing evidence indicating HFTs trade ahead
of other investors’ order flow. Future research could provide more detail on which characteristics of
past trades and orders allow HFTs to predict the stocks non-HFTs will buy and sell. Additionally,
research that specifically focuses on HFT trading around news could determine whether HFTs are
simply faster at reacting to news or if they are also better at interpreting it. Research into these
questions would improve our understanding of the ways HFTs acquire information and, in doing
so, inform evaluations of the welfare costs in addition to the benefits of HFT participation in the
price discovery process.
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Figure 1: Cumulative HFT vs. non-HFT Net Marketable Buying.
This figure plots cumulative standardized net marketable buying for stocks sorted into portfolios by HFTs’ net
marketable buying at the one-second horizon. The focus is whether the sort forecasts changes in cumulative non-
HFT imbalances after the sort period. The time t cumulative imbalance is the time t−1 cumulative imbalance plus the
time t imbalance. The left y-axis is for HFT net marketable buying, HFTNMB, and the right y-axis is for non-HFT net
marketable buying, non-HFTNMB. Stocks are sorted into deciles each second based on HFT net marketable buying.
Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading day. Stocks in decile ten are
marked as those HFTs are buying and those in decile one are marked as those HFTs are selling. Portfolio means are
calculated by first averaging across all observations for a day and then averaging across all days in the sample. Net
marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Imbalances
are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable across stocks. Both variables in the
figure are divided by their respective standard deviation among all sample stocks that day.
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Figure 2: Bid-Ask Midpoint Returns
This figure plots NBBO midpoint returns in basis points for stocks sorted into portfolios by HFTs’ net marketable
buying. Stocks are sorted into deciles each second based on HFT net marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are
calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading day. Stocks in decile ten are marked as those HFTs
are buying and those in decile one are marked as those HFTs are selling. Portfolio means are calculated by first
averaging across all observations for a day and then averaging across all days in the sample. Net marketable buying
is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-
day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable across stocks.
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Figure 3: HFT Net Buying around the HFT Net Marketable Buying Sorts
Cumulative standardized HFT net buying (HFTNB) around sorts on HFT net marketable buying (HFTNMB). The
time t cumulative imbalance is the time t−1 cumulative imbalance plus the time t imbalance. Panel A plots aggregate
HFTNB for stocks sorted on aggregate HFTNMB. Panel B plots HFTNB of three HFT groups (High, Mid, and Low)
for stocks sorted by the High group’s HFTNMB. HFTs are sorted into groups by the coefficient on the first lag of
the individual HFT’s HFTNMB in a regression of non-HFTNMB on ten lags of the HFT’s HFTNMB, non-HFTNMB,
and returns estimated during the prior month. Table 5 provides more detail on the sorting procedure. Stocks are
sorted into deciles each second based on HFT net marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-
zero observations during the prior trading day. Stocks in decile ten are marked as those HFTs are buying and those
in decile one are marked as those HFTs are selling. Portfolio means are calculated by first averaging across all
observations for a day and then averaging across all days in the sample. Net marketable buying is shares bought
in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Net buying is shares bought minus shares sold.
Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable across stocks. In both
panels, all HFTNB measures are divided by the standard deviation of aggregate HFTNB among all sample stocks
that day to ease interpretation.
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Figure 4: Non-HFT Price Impact with and without competition from HFTs
Impulse response functions for returns estimate the price impact of a 100 share shock to non-HFT net marketable
buying
(
non-HFTNMB
)
following Hasbrouck (1991). The first estimate uses the full VAR. The second is an estimate
for a counterfactual world with no HFT competition. It sets HFTNMB in every second to zero and measures price
impact if non-HFTNMB each second after the shock is the same as in the first scenario. The solid line is the estimated
response, and dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Estimates come from the VAR:
Rt =α1+
10∑
i=0
γ1,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=0
β1,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=0
ω1,iCt−i +
10∑
i=1
λ1,iRt−i +²1,t
HFTNMB,t =α2+
10∑
i=1
γ2,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=0
β2,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
ω2,iCt−i +
10∑
i=1
λ2,iRt−i +²2,t
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
10∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
ω3,iCt−i +
10∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t
Ct =

HFTNMB,t×non-HFTNMB,t, if HFTNMB,t > 0 and non-HFTNMB,t > 0
HFTNMB,t×non-HFTNMB,t×−1, if HFTNMB,t < 0 and non-HFTNMB,t < 0
0, otherwise
where Rt is NBBO midpoint return. Variables are measured at the one-second horizon and divided by their standard
deviation among all stocks that day. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares
sold in seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them
comparable across stocks. Equations are estimated for each stock every day. Coefficients are then averaged across
all stocks for a day, with stocks weighted by the minimum number of non-zero observations among the three variables.
The full-sample estimate is the mean of that daily coefficient time-series. Standard errors correct for autocorrelation
using the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method. Following estimation, the standardized share shocks
and return response are converted to share and basis point units for ease of interpretation.
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Figure 5: Persistence of Differences in Individual HFTs’ Prediction Ability
Given an HFT is among the top third of HFTs in terms of how their trades predict non-HFT order flow, the figure
plots the probability they will still be in the top third one, two, and three months later. The dotted line at 33.3% is
what would be expected in months 1–3 if there were no persistence in which HFTs’ trades are most strongly correlated
with future non-HFT trades. The four lines indicate different sorting methods using the 10-lag regression discussed
in Table 5. HFTNB is HFT net buying. HFTNMB is the HFT’s net marketable buying. Net marketable buying
is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Net buying is shares bought
minus shares sold. The probabilities are calculated for each sort month and then averaged across all sort months in
the sample. HFTs that leave the sample after the sort period are assigned to the lowest correlation group.
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Figure 6: Does HFT net marketable buying predict itself or non-HFT net
marketable buying better?
Comparison of HFT coefficients (γ2,i and γ3i below) from regressions where HFT and non-HFT trading are the
dependent variables. The solid line depicts the estimate and dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals. To make the
comparison in the same units, the standardized coefficients are converted to show the share change in the dependent
variable for a 100 share change in the HFT variable. The conversion uses the mean standard deviation of the variables
in Table 1. Y-axis is cut off above 0.5 to zoom in on higher lags. The regressions are equations 5 and 6 from Table 3:
HFTNMB,t =α2+
J∑
i=1
γ2,iHFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
β2,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
λ2,iRt−i +²2,t
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
J∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t
where Rt is NBBO midpoint return, HFTNMB,t is HFT net marketable buying, non-HFTNMB,t is non-HFT net
marketable buying, and J is the number of lags. Variables are measured at the one-second horizon and divided
by their standard deviation among all stocks that day. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated
trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume
to make them comparable across stocks. Equations are estimated for each stock every day. Coefficients are then
averaged across all stocks for a day, with stocks weighted by the minimum number of non-zero observations among
the three variables. The full-sample estimate is the mean of that daily coefficient time-series. Standard errors correct
for autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
The sample consists of 96 stocks chosen by randomly selecting six NASDAQ-listed and six NYSE-listed stocks
from each of the top eight NYSE size deciles of CRSP common stocks passing liquidity filters described in Section
2. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among NYSE-listed stocks. Size portfolios for year t are formed on
December 31st of year t−1. Deciles one through five are small-cap, six through eight are mid-cap, and nine through
ten are large-cap. Panel A summarizes stock characteristics calculated from the pooled time-series of all stock-day
observations. Market capitalization, price, and dollar volume are end of day values. NQ is the share of total dollar
volume that traded on NASDAQ, HFT is the fraction of NASDAQ dollar volume traded by HFTs, and N is stocks
per day in the sample. Panel B summarizes intra-day returns and net buying measures by reporting the mean and
median daily standard deviation of these variables across all stock days. Each day, for every stock, the following
are calculated: the standard deviation of NBBO midpoint returns (BAM Ret), HFTs’ net buying (HFTNB), HFTs’
net marketable buying (HFTNMB), and non-HFTs’ net marketable buying (non-HFTNMB). Net buying is shares
bought minus shares sold. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in
seller-initiated trades. For this table only, imbalance measures are expressed in shares.
Panel A: Daily Stock Characteristics
Mkt Cap Price Volume NQ HFT N
Mil. $ $ Mil. $ % %
All Stocks mean 5,302 26.38 58.1 27.2 27.6 93.2
median 1,301 22.05 12.6 25.0 27.7 93.0
std dev 12,909 19.96 111.4 13.5 13.7 1.6
min 22 0.91 0.1 0.7 0.0 89.0
max 125,331 166.82 2,153.1 80.7 78.4 96.0
Small-cap mean 367 16.52 4.0 26.3 16.7 33.4
median 293 14.77 1.9 22.5 14.8 33.0
Mid-cap mean 1,900 26.10 34.2 27.1 28.9 35.8
median 1,565 25.04 15.5 26.0 29.2 36.0
Large-cap mean 17,252 40.55 169.3 28.5 40.7 24.0
median 9,413 31.37 120.2 26.9 40.9 24.0
Panel B: Standard Deviation of Intra-day Variables
BAM Ret HFTNB HFTNMB non-HFTNMB
% shares shares shares
All Stocks mean 0.080 83 80 125
median 0.027 28 26 42
Small-cap mean 0.052 13 11 27
median 0.031 9 7 18
Mid-cap mean 0.085 89 81 138
median 0.022 35 34 49
Large-cap mean 0.114 175 178 247
median 0.023 116 123 138
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Table 2
Stocks Sorted by HFT Net Marketable Buying
This table shows standardized non-HFT net marketable buying and NBBO midpoint returns for stocks sorted on
HFTs’ net marketable buying at the one-second horizon. Stocks are sorted into deciles at time t based on HFT
net-marketable buying. Decile breakpoints are calculated from non-zero observations during the prior trading
day. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable across stocks.
Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades.
Non-HFT net marketable buying and returns for portfolios are averaged across all observations for a day, and
the mean of the daily time series is reported in the table. Parentheses indicate t-statistics for the time-series
means, with autocorrelation corrections following the optimal automatic lag selection method of Newey and West
(1994). The reported imbalance is divided by its standard deviation among all stocks that day to ease interpretation.
Panel A: Non-HFT Net Marketable Buying
Decile Seconds
[t−30, t−1] t−1 t t+1 [t+1, t+30] [t+1, t+300]
All Stocks
10 (HFT Buying) 0.26 0.10 0.58 0.10 0.65 1.15
(4.39) (22.01) (24.92) (26.17) (14.35) (2.41)
9 0.12 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.26 0.50
(10.35) (25.24) (24.86) (21.91) (23.47) (7.28)
2 −0.11 −0.04 −0.22 −0.03 −0.26 −0.62
(−10.69) (−24.92) (−26.79) (−29.18) (−25.85) (−8.59)
1 (HFT Selling) −0.29 −0.10 −0.58 −0.09 −0.69 −1.89
(−4.52) (−20.24) (−32.28) (−19.66) (−10.15) (−4.26)
Small-cap
10 (HFT Buying) 1.09 0.25 1.09 0.21 1.39 2.42
(5.49) (18.14) (20.60) (13.91) (9.68) (1.54)
1 (HFT Selling) −1.04 −0.26 −1.07 −0.19 −1.27 −3.27
(−4.68) (−11.71) (−27.77) (−10.16) (−5.40) (−2.27)
Panel B: NBBO midpoint returns in basis points
Decile Seconds
[t−30, t−1] t−1 t t+1 [t+1, t+30] [t+1, t+300]
All Stocks
10 (HFT Buying) 4.43 4.51 0.92 0.55 1.23 0.57
(25.26) (25.49) (15.91) (17.98) (11.78) (1.16)
9 3.24 3.20 0.65 0.47 0.70 0.55
(29.04) (24.28) (9.41) (14.53) (14.03) (3.63)
2 −3.04 −3.11 −0.51 −0.34 −0.51 0.05
(−30.62) (−27.98) (−8.95) (−11.07) (−7.42) (0.30)
1 (HFT Selling) −4.30 −4.47 −0.81 −0.46 −1.07 −0.58
(−26.30) (−27.66) (−14.28) (−14.58) (−13.48) (−1.42)
Small-cap
10 (HFT Buying) 7.98 6.63 1.31 0.61 2.54 1.36
(19.77) (19.64) (13.75) (11.48) (8.41) (0.86)
1 (HFT Selling) −7.59 −6.55 −1.19 −0.57 −2.64 −3.09
(−15.25) (−21.68) (−15.07) (−13.08) (−14.37) (−2.58)
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Table 3
Intra-day VAR Estimates for Individual Stock-day Observations
For each stock-day observation, the following vector autoregressions (VARs) with ten lags are estimated:
Rt =α1+
10∑
i=1
γ1,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β1,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ1,iRt−i +²1,t (4)
HFTNMB,t =α2+
10∑
i=1
γ2,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β2,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ2,iRt−i +²2,t (5)
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
10∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t (6)
where Rt is the NBBO midpoint return, HFTNMB,t is HFT net marketable buying, and non-HFTNMB,t is non-HFT
net marketable buying. Variables are measured at the one-second horizon and divided by their standard deviation
among all stocks that day. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in
seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable
across stocks. Equations are estimated for each stock every day. Coefficients are then averaged across all stocks
for a day, with stocks weighted by the minimum number of non-zero observations among the three variables. The
full-sample estimate is the mean of that daily coefficient time-series. Standard errors correct for autocorrelation
using the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method.
lag γ (HFT) β (non-HFT) λ (R)
µ t-stat µ t-stat µ t-stat
y= non-HFTt
1 0.0007 2.21 0.0754 37.32 0.9181 13.68
2 0.0021 15.47 0.0246 39.42 −0.0145 −4.28
3 0.0020 13.12 0.0184 38.72 −0.0008 −0.53
4 0.0018 12.62 0.0153 33.37 −0.0028 −1.95
5 0.0015 13.52 0.0145 38.66 −0.0032 −2.41
6 0.0017 14.00 0.0111 25.98 0.0047 4.68
7 0.0015 13.97 0.0093 33.33 0.0016 1.54
8 0.0016 15.41 0.0084 28.33 0.0005 0.73
9 0.0016 13.59 0.0089 30.21 −0.0002 −0.22
10 0.0016 13.48 0.0117 30.19 −0.0025 −2.59
y=HFTt
1 0.0243 25.55 0.0028 2.64 1.9956 10.19
2 0.0088 24.58 0.0007 1.49 0.0290 4.79
3 0.0056 19.07 −0.0001 −0.21 −0.0047 −2.16
4 0.0039 17.41 −0.0008 −2.32 −0.0124 −6.52
5 0.0042 15.42 −0.0013 −3.34 −0.0131 −7.84
6 0.0026 10.34 −0.0011 −3.11 −0.0125 −7.26
7 0.0022 9.79 −0.0014 −3.98 −0.0117 −7.40
8 0.0014 7.30 −0.0007 −2.35 −0.0127 −9.49
9 0.0015 7.26 −0.0012 −3.34 −0.0148 −8.26
10 0.0007 3.28 −0.0019 −5.56 −0.0121 −7.83
y=Rt
1 0.0185 10.92 0.0269 14.82 −0.1551 −55.30
2 0.0115 11.82 0.0155 12.64 −0.1310 −63.87
3 0.0085 11.93 0.0119 9.85 −0.1070 −68.61
4 0.0067 9.60 0.0102 11.30 −0.0906 −66.86
5 0.0056 9.94 0.0078 10.86 −0.0749 −71.81
6 0.0042 10.60 0.0066 11.69 −0.0645 −72.24
7 0.0035 7.67 0.0037 6.65 −0.0522 −70.93
8 0.0023 10.21 0.0041 10.01 −0.0420 −77.02
9 0.0017 5.68 0.0018 3.24 −0.0308 −77.50
10 −0.0001 −0.38 −0.0003 −0.73 −0.0188 −67.19
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Table 4
Example Patterns Predicting non-HFT Net Marketable Buying and Returns
This table reports two patterns that predict non-HFT net marketable buying (non-HFTNMB), HFT net marketable
buying (HFTNMB), and NBBO midpoint returns in basis points (R). Stocks are sorted in second t into Buy and Sell
portfolios based on values for second t−1 and accumulated values from seconds t−5 to t−1:
Pattern 1 Pattern 2
Buy Sell Buy Sell∑5
l=1 non-HFTNMB,t−l > 2 < 2 > non-HFTNMB,t−1 < non-HFTNMB,t−1
non-HFTNMB,t−1 > 0 < 0 > 1 <−1∏5
l=1
(
1+Rt−l
)−1 ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0
Rt−1 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Imbal-
ances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable across stocks. Portfolio values are
averaged across all observations for a day, and the mean of the daily time series is reported in the table. Parentheses
indicate t-statistics for the time-series means, with autocorrelation corrections following the optimal automatic lag
selection method of Newey and West (1994).
Seconds
[t−30, t−1] [t−5, t−1] t−1 t t+1 [t+1, t+30] [t+1, t+300]
Panel A: Pattern 1
non-HFTNMB Buy 9.10 7.00 5.04 0.25 0.27 2.69 7.43
(85.75) (99.22) (97.38) (23.65) (35.90) (36.66) (10.67)
Sell −9.08 −6.97 −5.03 −0.23 −0.26 −2.74 −8.16
(−72.84) (−96.20) (−100.03) (−29.66) (−22.62) (−21.34) (−13.29)
Diff 18.19 13.97 10.07 0.48 0.53 5.43 15.60
(99.98) (106.00) (103.37) (29.76) (32.48) (34.46) (33.61)
Return (bps) Buy 7.01 5.89 0.00 0.36 0.14 1.68 2.96
(24.04) (26.56) – (17.44) (5.95) (13.80) (7.21)
Sell −7.11 −5.88 0.00 −0.26 −0.15 −1.64 −2.61
(−23.32) (−28.47) – (−8.64) (−8.61) (−14.51) (−8.58)
Diff 14.12 11.77 0.00 0.61 0.29 3.32 5.58
(23.95) (27.76) – (16.62) (9.32) (15.71) (14.79)
HFTNMB Buy 2.73 1.59 0.73 0.08 0.08 0.47 0.96
(20.43) (24.51) (36.62) (7.05) (13.61) (6.04) (3.27)
Sell −2.48 −1.51 −0.70 −0.07 −0.07 −0.34 −0.35
(−38.73) (−36.83) (−38.43) (−16.49) (−17.42) (−9.11) (−1.45)
Diff 5.21 3.10 1.43 0.16 0.15 0.81 1.31
(35.97) (31.65) (39.86) (10.34) (20.62) (8.89) (6.94)
Panel B: Pattern 2
non-HFTNMB Buy 12.04 8.61 3.83 0.45 0.50 4.11 10.05
(55.99) (61.08) (86.23) (24.09) (29.94) (32.72) (9.65)
Sell −12.11 −8.60 −3.84 −0.44 −0.49 −4.33 −11.44
(−45.01) (−55.81) (−75.04) (−21.21) (−18.35) (−16.77) (−10.43)
Diff 24.15 17.21 7.67 0.89 0.99 8.44 21.50
(59.62) (61.58) (86.93) (24.81) (25.30) (27.72) (28.14)
Return (bps) Buy 8.73 6.65 0.00 0.42 0.17 1.72 2.26
(25.81) (28.85) – (12.23) (4.22) (11.48) (3.75)
Sell −8.88 −6.71 0.00 −0.26 −0.20 −1.63 −2.02
(−27.70) (−31.83) – (−6.15) (−6.42) (−13.31) (−4.07)
Diff 17.61 13.37 0.00 0.68 0.37 3.35 4.28
(26.70) (30.80) – (13.19) (7.06) (15.54) (12.55)
HFTNMB Buy 4.20 2.32 0.72 0.12 0.11 0.57 1.08
(20.31) (21.55) (24.32) (6.48) (12.72) (4.54) (2.68)
Sell −3.72 −2.20 −0.69 −0.11 −0.09 −0.27 −0.17
(−29.84) (−27.07) (−30.61) (−10.18) (−8.85) (−4.62) (−0.48)
Diff 7.92 4.53 1.41 0.23 0.20 0.85 1.25
(32.49) (25.89) (28.53) (8.54) (14.10) (5.80) (3.50)
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Table 5
Examining Differences in Individual HFTs’ Prediction Ability
This table tests whether trades from some HFTs consistently predict future buying and selling pressure better than
others. The test examines whether the HFTs who predict buying and selling pressure the best one month continue
to do so the next month. Each day, the following regression is run for each HFT:
non-HFTd,s,t =αd,i +
J∑
l=1
γd,i,lHFTd,s,i,t−l +
J∑
l=1
βd,i,lnon-HFTd,s,t−l +
J∑
i=1
λd,i,lRd,s,t−l +²d,i,s,t, (7)
where d indexes days, s indexes stocks, t indexes seconds, J is either 10 or 30 lags, and i indexes HFTs. non-
HFT is non-HFT net marketable buying, HFT is either the HFT’s net buying (HFTNB) or net marketable buying
(HFTNMB), and R is the stock’s NBBO midpoint return. Net buying is shares bought minus shares sold. Net
marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. The individual
HFTs’ net marketable buying and net buying measures are divided by the standard deviation of aggregate HFT net
marketable buying and net buying, respectively. The left set of columns in the table below report results from
regressions where HFT is HFTs’ net marketable buying, and the right set report results where HFT is their net
buying. For regression (7), I require there to be more than 100 non-zero net marketable buying observations to
ensure relatively precise coefficient estimates. Then for each month, among HFTs for whom regression (7) could be
estimated at least 15 days during the current and following month, HFTs are split into three groups based on their γi
coefficients. There are three groupings: 1) HFTs are split based on their γd,i,1 for that month in a 10-lag regression,
2), the split is based on their
∑10
l=1γd,i,l in the 10-lag regression, and 3) the split is based on their
∑30
l=1γd,i,l in the
30-lag regression. The cross-sectional average γd,i,1,
∑10
l=1γd,i,l , and
∑30
l=1γd,i,l coefficients are then calculated the
following month (i.e., the post-sort month). For each group’s monthly time series, the table reports the time-series
mean, p-value for the test that the mean is different from zero using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation
following the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method, time-series median, number of months out of 11
that the value is greater than zero, and p-value from a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test that the time-series
median is equal to zero. I report p-values for the t-test because the small number of months means standard rules
of thumb (e.g., t-stat > 1.96) for determining statistical significance do not apply. High-frequency traders go in and
out of the sample, so months are weighted by the number of HFTs in that month’s group.
HFT = Net Mkt. Buying HFT = Net Buying
µt+1 p-value median #>0of 11
Wilcoxon
p-value µt+1 p-value median
#>0
of 11
Wilcoxon
p-value
γd,i,1
H in montht 0.024 < 0.01 0.024 11 < 0.01 0.031 < 0.01 0.029 11 < 0.01
M in montht 0.008 < 0.01 0.008 11 < 0.01 0.010 < 0.01 0.010 11 < 0.01
L in montht −0.005 0.12 −0.001 4 0.24 −0.003 0.01 −0.002 2 0.04
High−Low 0.029 < 0.01 0.028 11 < 0.01 0.034 < 0.01 0.032 11 < 0.01∑10
l=1γd,i,l
H in montht 0.095 < 0.01 0.095 11 < 0.01 0.107 < 0.01 0.089 11 < 0.01
M in montht 0.033 < 0.01 0.030 11 < 0.01 0.033 < 0.01 0.033 11 < 0.01
L in montht −0.006 0.66 0.010 7 0.90 −0.001 0.80 0.000 6 0.90
High−Low 0.102 < 0.01 0.094 11 < 0.01 0.108 < 0.01 0.089 11 < 0.01∑30
l=1γd,i,l
H in montht1 0.136 0.04 0.134 10 < 0.01 0.124 < 0.01 0.118 11 < 0.01
M in montht1 0.053 < 0.01 0.042 11 < 0.01 0.048 < 0.01 0.044 10 < 0.01
L in montht1 0.023 0.02 0.028 9 0.05 0.014 0.11 0.010 10 0.02
High−Low1 0.114 0.02 0.129 9 < 0.01 0.110 < 0.01 0.114 11 < 0.01
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Table 6
Differences among HFTs in How Strongly Their Marketable Trades Forecast Returns
This table examines whether trades from the HFTs whose trades are most strongly correlated with future non-HFT
order flow also predict larger future NBBO midpoint returns. HFTs are split into three groups each month based on
the correlation between their marketable trades and future non-HFT order flow. The split is based on the average
γd,i,1 coefficient from Regression 7 in Table 5 estimated during the prior month. Table 5 provides more detail on the
methodology for sorting HFTs. Once HFT groups are determined, all their trades are then aggregated among HFTs
in the same group during the post-sort month. The table below compares coefficients on the top and bottom HFT
groups’ aggregate net marketable buying in regressions of the following form:
Rt =α+
10∑
i=1
γiHFT
G
NMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
βinon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λiRt−i +²t,R (8)
where Rt is NBBO midpoint return, HFTGNMB,t is HFT net marketable buying for either group, and non-HFTNMB,t
is non-HFT net marketable buying. All variables are measured at the one-second horizon. Net marketable buying is
shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day
trailing average daily volume to make them comparable across stocks. Returns and non-HFT net marketable buying
are divided by their one-second standard deviations, whereas the HFT groups’ net marketable buying is divided by
the one-second standard deviation of HFTNMB aggregated among all HFTs. The values reported are the time-series
mean and median of daily cross-sectional mean coefficients. For t-tests, the null hypothesis is that the mean of the
daily time series equals zero. Standard errors correct for autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1994) optimal
lag selection method. The difference column group also reports the p-value from a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank
sum test that the time-series medians are equal.
lag High in montht−1 HFTs’ γi Low in montht−1 γi Difference
mean t-stat median mean t-stat median mean t-stat rank sum
p-value
1 0.0328 10.44 0.0259 0.0268 10.69 0.0235 0.0060 2.41 0.02
2 0.0210 10.80 0.0169 0.0160 11.53 0.0146 0.0051 3.39 0.01
3 0.0160 10.62 0.0133 0.0125 10.10 0.0111 0.0035 3.00 0.02
4 0.0118 11.16 0.0101 0.0086 8.73 0.0086 0.0033 3.43 0.02
5 0.0098 9.77 0.0082 0.0087 9.31 0.0079 0.0012 1.06 0.18
6 0.0080 8.16 0.0060 0.0064 5.93 0.0057 0.0016 1.68 0.28
7 0.0061 6.20 0.0046 0.0049 4.79 0.0046 0.0013 1.25 0.75
8 0.0038 6.43 0.0029 0.0023 2.37 0.0028 0.0015 1.37 0.68
9 0.0028 3.40 0.0016 0.0030 2.94 0.0032 -0.0002 -0.16 0.20
10 -0.0004 -0.57 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.43 0.0009 0.0000 0.03 0.41
Σ 1-10 0.1119 10.69 0.0945 0.0887 10.59 0.0794 0.0231 3.78 0.00
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Table 7
Conditioning on Times when non-HFTs are Hypothesized to be Impatient
This table reports coefficients on HFTs’ net marketable buying from the VAR in Table 3 conditional on times when
non-HFTs are impatient. Estimates are from the equation,
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
10∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t,
where Rt is NBBO midpoint return, HFTNMB,t is HFT net marketable buying, and non-HFTNMB,t is non-HFT
net marketable buying. Variables are measured at the one-second horizon and divided by their standard deviation
among all stocks that day. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in
seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable
across stocks. Equations are estimated for each stock every day. Coefficients are then averaged across all stocks
for a day, with stocks weighted by the minimum number of non-zero observations among the three variables. The
full-sample estimate is the mean of that daily coefficient time-series. Standard errors correct for autocorrelation
using the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method. In Panel B, high volume and high absolute
daily aggregate net marketable buying imbalance days are those among the top 10% of days the past month (i.e.,
rank relative to prior 19 trading days is 19 or 20). The daily average spread and relative spread are calculated by
duration-weighting intra-day observations. For either spread measure, the high/low spread groups consist of stocks
in the top/bottom third of the sample the prior day.
Panel A: Comparing γ estimates from the open and close to the middle of the day
Difference with Mid-day
9:30–10:00am 10:00am–3:30pm 3:30–4:00pm 9:30–10:00am 3:30–4:00pm
lag mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat
1 0.0026 4.43 0.0003 0.90 −0.0050 −10.68 0.0023 4.48 −0.0053 −11.88
2 0.0033 7.96 0.0018 12.55 0.0004 1.30 0.0015 3.85 −0.0014 −3.95
3 0.0023 7.72 0.0018 13.39 0.0009 3.14 0.0005 1.69 −0.0009 −3.86
Σ 1-10 0.0207 14.14 0.0131 12.24 0.0065 5.21 0.0076 6.92 −0.0067 −4.68
Panel B: Comparing γ estimates on high volume/imbalance days to all other days
Volume Imbalance
High Not High Difference High Not High Difference
lag mean mean mean t-stat mean mean mean t-stat
1 0.0036 0.0004 0.0033 3.94 0.0018 0.0006 0.0013 2.13
2 0.0039 0.0018 0.0021 4.00 0.0031 0.0020 0.0013 2.88
3 0.0029 0.0019 0.0010 2.62 0.0024 0.0020 0.0005 0.91
Σ 1-10 0.0235 0.0149 0.0086 4.80 0.0192 0.0156 0.0042 2.10
Panel C: Comparing γ estimates from high spread stocks to low spread stocks
Bid-Ask Spread Relative Spread (Spread / Midpoint)
High Low Difference High Low Difference
lag mean mean mean t-stat mean mean mean t-stat
1 0.0050 −0.0019 0.0069 17.66 0.0040 −0.0003 0.0043 7.21
2 0.0031 0.0015 0.0015 3.92 0.0034 0.0019 0.0015 2.96
3 0.0025 0.0018 0.0007 2.27 0.0029 0.0019 0.0010 2.70
Σ 1-10 0.0215 0.0127 0.0087 8.55 0.0199 0.0153 0.0046 2.79
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Table 8
VAR Estimates on Days without News
This table reports coefficients on HFTs’ net marketable buying from the VAR equation in Table 3 after excluding
either stock days with news or stock days within five days of news. The table shows results for lags 1–3, the sum of
all 10 lags (Σ), and the 10-lag sum on days without news minus the 10-lag sum on all days
(
Σ−ΣNE
)
. News days are
defined as days with a Factiva news article, an analyst earnings forecast revision, an analyst recommendation change,
management earnings guidance, a form 8-K filing, or a large absolute value of the stock’s market-adjusted return.
Estimates are from the equation where the dependent variable is non-HFT net marketable buying,
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
10∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t,
where Rt is NBBO midpoint return, HFTNMB,t is HFT net marketable buying, and non-HFTNMB,t is non-HFT
net marketable buying. Variables are measured at the one-second horizon and divided by their standard deviation
among all stocks that day. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in
seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable
across stocks. Equations are estimated for each stock every day. Coefficients are then averaged across all stocks
for a day, with stocks weighted by the minimum number of non-zero observations among the three variables. The
full-sample estimate is the mean of that daily coefficient time-series. Standard errors correct for autocorrelation
using the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method.
Lag Sum of lags 1-10
Exclude Stock-days with 1 2 3 Σ Σ−ΣNE #Stocks-days
None Excluded (NE) 0.0007 0.0021 0.0020 0.0161 23,071
(2.21) (15.47) (13.12) (20.30)
Factiva News on
Day t 0.0018 0.0020 0.0019 0.0155 −0.0006 10,838
(4.64) (7.18) (11.74) (17.08) (−0.92)
Days [t−5, t+5] 0.0027 0.0031 0.0024 0.0175 0.0014 2,227
(2.66) (3.09) (2.61) (7.81) (0.62)
IBES Forecast, Recommendation, or Guidance on
Day t 0.0004 0.0018 0.0020 0.0152 −0.0009 19,112
(1.26) (13.31) (10.69) (21.23) (−3.34)
Days [t−5, t+5] 0.0004 0.0018 0.0015 0.0142 −0.0019 9,298
(1.09) (5.99) (6.40) (15.79) (−2.98)
Form 8-K Filed on
Day t 0.0006 0.0020 0.0020 0.0158 −0.0003 22,089
(1.92) (14.34) (12.77) (21.76) (−2.00)
Days [t−5, t+5] 0.0007 0.0020 0.0019 0.0160 −0.0001 17,302
(1.88) (13.57) (13.41) (20.27) (−0.28)
|Market-adjusted Return on Day t |
> 1% −0.0001 0.0019 0.0019 0.0151 −0.0010 9,478
(−0.17) (8.97) (11.42) (17.08) (−1.95)
> 0.5% −0.0001 0.0020 0.0015 0.0141 −0.0020 5,114
(−0.17) (7.52) (8.19) (15.86) (−2.38)
> 0.25% 0.0002 0.0022 0.0013 0.0126 −0.0035 2,577
(0.37) (6.26) (6.34) (10.72) (−3.29)
|Mkt. Adj. Return on Day t | > 0.25% or Factiva, IBES, or 8-K news on
Day t 0.0014 0.0022 0.0014 0.0137 −0.0024 5,602
(2.78) (6.58) (5.29) (10.62) (−2.10)
Days [t−5, t+5] 0.0033 0.0028 0.0011 0.0167 0.0007 835
(1.79) (3.90) (1.46) (4.27) (0.18)
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A Internet Appendix
Table IA.1
Summary of CRSP Universe
This table summarizes 2009 stock-day observations for CRSP common stocks with dual-class stocks removed. The
table summarizes market capitalization (mv), dollar volume (dolvol), and price (prc). Market value and dollar volume
are in millions. The column szp denotes size deciles. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among NYSE-listed
stocks. Size portfolios for year t are formed on December 31st of year t−1. Deciles one through five are small-cap,
six through eight are mid-cap, and nine through ten are large-cap.
szp nstocks avg sd min q1 q2 q3 max
mv
1 690 18 23 0 7 12 19 436
2 753 58 56 1 30 44 64 996
3 589 139 100 4 81 114 165 1,525
4 575 305 216 13 188 262 360 5,695
5 414 576 308 24 389 509 672 3,526
6 312 977 447 31 698 883 1,126 4,194
7 275 1,677 728 101 1,193 1,538 1,981 6,643
8 212 2,871 1,092 373 2,164 2,672 3,341 10,955
9 213 5,645 2,450 523 3,926 5,208 6,876 33,010
10 202 35,668 43,505 2,375 13,512 19,839 34,675 415,274
dolvol
1 690 0.15 1.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 324.23
2 753 0.45 2.88 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.19 231.69
3 589 1.27 5.30 0.00 0.12 0.34 0.89 590.10
4 575 3.34 13.92 0.00 0.59 1.36 2.97 1,533.59
5 414 7.41 17.36 0.00 1.85 3.63 7.49 1,704.35
6 312 14.23 26.80 0.00 4.14 7.70 15.22 1,674.99
7 275 26.72 34.07 0.06 9.90 17.49 31.94 2,655.60
8 212 44.17 57.97 0.07 17.25 30.10 54.75 7,143.57
9 213 90.52 120.99 0.52 40.24 65.87 106.64 7,129.60
10 202 374.36 556.13 7.96 128.37 218.11 381.70 19,972.16
prc
1 690 2.13 3.24 0.01 0.54 1.24 2.63 78.00
2 753 4.99 5.10 0.01 1.65 3.51 6.71 62.00
3 589 7.87 7.92 0.05 3.10 5.96 10.06 329.79
4 575 12.59 10.99 0.10 5.74 9.71 16.33 155.72
5 414 17.14 14.09 0.06 8.32 14.09 22.36 195.98
6 312 20.60 12.78 0.26 11.30 17.94 26.66 103.86
7 275 29.12 71.06 0.25 14.26 22.42 32.79 1,549.00
8 212 38.63 58.21 0.75 17.76 26.94 39.49 731.00
9 213 32.17 22.92 0.35 18.77 27.70 39.77 306.58
10 202 45.08 43.05 1.02 24.63 37.39 52.40 622.87
1
Table IA.2
Sample Universe
This table summarizes 2009 stock-day observations for the set of stocks from which the sample is constructed. The
stocks consist of CRSP common equities with dual-class stocks removed. Stocks are also excluded from the sample
universe if they fall in the bottom two size deciles, if their price at the end of 2008 is less than $5, or if average daily
dollar volume in December 2008 is less than $1 million dollars. The table summarizes market capitalization, mv,
dollar volume, dolvol, and price, prc. Market value and dollar volume are in millions. The column szp denotes size
deciles. Size portfolio breakpoints are computed among NYSE-listed stocks. Size portfolios for year t are formed on
December 31st of year t−1. Deciles one through five are small-cap, six through eight are mid-cap, and nine through
ten are large-cap.
szp nstocks avg sd min q1 q2 q3 max
mv
3 44 175 90 22 114 160 216 674
4 322 319 162 24 215 289 381 2,151
5 347 554 244 28 392 506 655 2,499
6 293 956 421 31 692 875 1,105 4,194
7 261 1,656 695 169 1,189 1,529 1,961 5,977
8 205 2,858 1,057 373 2,169 2,672 3,329 10,955
9 209 5,568 2,216 523 3,915 5,176 6,835 17,693
10 201 35,774 43,588 2,375 13,525 19,917 34,872 415,274
dolvol
3 44 1.88 3.86 0.00 0.60 1.15 2.16 229.51
4 322 3.36 7.18 0.00 1.02 1.88 3.56 888.89
5 347 6.59 13.04 0.00 1.98 3.64 7.07 1,704.35
6 293 13.31 22.07 0.00 4.11 7.51 14.46 1,283.42
7 261 25.71 31.28 0.06 9.82 17.16 30.99 2,655.60
8 205 43.30 46.58 0.07 17.20 29.88 54.12 1,969.46
9 209 85.76 84.23 0.52 39.87 65.17 105.01 2,761.70
10 201 375.33 557.28 7.96 128.60 218.68 382.83 19,972.16
prc
3 44 12.66 11.78 0.91 6.84 10.60 15.58 329.79
4 322 14.82 10.17 0.73 7.95 12.12 18.88 111.85
5 347 18.17 11.53 0.53 9.78 15.62 23.60 120.33
6 293 21.51 12.55 0.26 12.62 18.69 27.31 103.86
7 261 30.37 72.71 1.04 15.38 23.34 33.45 1,549.00
8 205 39.33 58.76 1.02 18.28 27.27 39.79 731.00
9 209 32.65 22.84 1.03 19.25 27.98 40.08 306.58
10 201 45.28 43.07 1.02 24.85 37.53 52.49 622.87
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Table IA.3
Summary of News Data
This table summarizes news data. News for a stock comes from the Factiva news archive. Panel A shows the
distribution among sample stocks in the total number of articles and number of trading days with news. The left
two columns in Panel B show the top 10 sources for time-stamped news, and the right three columns shows the
number of stamped vs. all articles from three major business news publications.
Panel A: Distribution of Articles
Per Stock Time-stamped Articles All Articles
Articles Days with Articles Articles Days with Articles
mean 70 29 762 130
sd 147 33 1611 78
0% 1 1 14 12
25% 12 8 128 60
50% 22 16 227 105
75% 83 40 884 207
100% 1106 158 11877 251
Panel B: Source Summary
Top Time-stamped News Sources Stamp/No-stamp Breakdown for Major Sources
Articles Stamped All
Dow Jones News Service 871 Dow Jones 4413 6597
Associated Press Newswires 751 Reuters 1317 3234
MidnightTrader 604 Wall Street Journal 174 1556
PR Newswire (U.S.) 488
Reuters News 365
Regulatory News Service 341
Business Wire 337
MarketWatch 259
Market News Publishing 234
DJ em Portugu??s 219
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Table IA.4
Robustness of VAR to Price Feed Latency
This table tests whether potentially mismatched NASDAQ trade and NBBO quote timestamps affect the VAR results
in Table 3 by re-running the VAR using NASDAQ BBO midpoint returns rather than NBBO midpoint returns. The
NASDAQ trade and NASDAQ BBO timestamps are precisely aligned. Since calculating the NASDAQ BBO is
computationally intensive, the VAR uses only a subset of the sample period, January 1st to March 4th of 2009. Panel
A reports results with NASDAQ BBO midpoint returns, and Panel B reports results with NBBO midpoint returns
over the same time period. For each stock-day observation, the following vector autoregressions (VARs) with ten lags
are estimated:
Rt =α1+
10∑
i=1
γ1,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β1,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ1,iRt−i +²1,t (9)
HFTNMB,t =α2+
10∑
i=1
γ2,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β2,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ2,iRt−i +²2,t (10)
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
10∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
10∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t (11)
where Rt is the bid-ask midpoint return, HFTNMB,t is HFT net marketable buying, and non-HFTNMB,t is non-HFT
net marketable buying. Variables are measured at the one-second horizon and divided by their standard deviation
among all stocks that day. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated trades minus shares sold in
seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume to make them comparable
across stocks. Equations are estimated for each stock every day. Coefficients are then averaged across all stocks
for a day, with stocks weighted by the minimum number of non-zero observations among the three variables. The
full-sample estimate is the mean of that daily coefficient time-series. Standard errors correct for autocorrelation using
the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method.
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Table IA.4 — continued
Panel A: NASDAQ BBO time-series average of mean daily coefficients
lag γ (HFT) β (non-HFT) λ (R)
µ t-stat µ t-stat µ t-stat
y= non-HFTt
1 0.0018 5.99 0.0515 26.96 0.1714 29.85
2 0.0025 17.08 0.0217 33.62 −0.0002 −0.30
3 0.0022 9.64 0.0159 39.73 −0.0002 −0.44
4 0.0022 8.78 0.0139 19.04 0.0004 1.62
5 0.0021 10.02 0.0127 31.66 −0.0002 −0.82
6 0.0020 8.63 0.0101 20.81 0.0006 1.59
7 0.0015 9.56 0.0073 27.62 0.0006 2.37
8 0.0014 7.84 0.0073 16.94 0.0006 3.01
9 0.0015 8.11 0.0075 16.57 0.0003 1.69
10 0.0017 9.67 0.0097 31.78 0.0000 −0.27
y=HFTt
1 0.0292 26.26 0.0059 6.92 0.3536 33.51
2 0.0069 5.20 −0.0005 −0.60 0.0148 18.34
3 0.0029 5.11 0.0002 0.43 0.0042 5.48
4 0.0032 9.88 −0.0004 −0.76 0.0020 4.05
5 0.0021 5.47 −0.0006 −0.90 0.0009 2.24
6 0.0011 4.72 −0.0009 −1.73 0.0006 1.24
7 0.0008 2.71 −0.0011 −1.94 0.0000 0.03
8 0.0001 0.19 −0.0010 −2.59 −0.0004 −1.15
9 −0.0001 −0.34 −0.0009 −1.20 −0.0005 −1.56
10 −0.0004 −1.26 −0.0005 −0.93 −0.0011 −4.00
y=Rt
1 0.0222 18.79 0.0310 42.20 −0.0514 −26.91
2 0.0135 18.97 0.0177 29.16 −0.0359 −26.36
3 0.0088 21.64 0.0142 26.74 −0.0257 −28.86
4 0.0074 20.69 0.0109 18.32 −0.0209 −22.87
5 0.0049 17.89 0.0095 15.41 −0.0172 −27.38
6 0.0039 12.20 0.0067 12.52 −0.0145 −22.60
7 0.0028 12.24 0.0050 10.11 −0.0111 −24.67
8 0.0020 4.77 0.0051 13.58 −0.0089 −26.60
9 0.0017 3.90 0.0062 11.09 −0.0073 −17.33
10 0.0000 −0.10 0.0028 6.42 −0.0070 −10.37
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Table IA.4 — continued
Panel B: NBBO time-series average of mean daily coefficients
lag γ (HFT) β (non-HFT) λ (R)
µ t-stat µ t-stat µ t-stat
y= non-HFTt
1 0.0013 4.58 0.0515 27.82 0.5567 20.80
2 0.0025 18.78 0.0218 30.73 0.0031 1.43
3 0.0022 9.84 0.0160 38.39 0.0000 −0.02
4 0.0020 7.45 0.0140 18.35 0.0007 0.59
5 0.0021 9.08 0.0129 31.71 −0.0003 −0.24
6 0.0020 6.91 0.0102 21.32 0.0022 1.76
7 0.0014 8.32 0.0073 28.05 0.0021 2.21
8 0.0013 6.79 0.0074 18.35 0.0025 2.53
9 0.0014 8.33 0.0074 16.87 0.0016 1.92
10 0.0017 8.79 0.0098 28.75 0.0008 1.16
y=HFTt
1 0.0306 26.21 0.0080 8.35 1.0500 32.56
2 0.0076 5.59 0.0008 0.94 0.0287 10.59
3 0.0030 5.97 0.0007 1.55 0.0041 1.80
4 0.0031 10.42 −0.0001 −0.21 0.0011 0.76
5 0.0021 5.36 −0.0001 −0.11 −0.0015 −1.14
6 0.0011 4.90 −0.0007 −1.44 −0.0036 −3.19
7 0.0006 2.51 −0.0009 −1.71 −0.0027 −3.98
8 −0.0002 −0.67 −0.0009 −2.29 −0.0039 −10.39
9 −0.0003 −0.69 −0.0009 −1.30 −0.0042 −2.77
10 −0.0005 −1.81 −0.0001 −0.15 −0.0044 −4.26
y=Rt
1 0.0219 13.64 0.0263 20.90 −0.1260 −30.00
2 0.0138 12.19 0.0156 24.01 −0.1087 −40.03
3 0.0102 14.88 0.0140 10.84 −0.0888 −42.30
4 0.0081 13.95 0.0092 12.38 −0.0758 −36.43
5 0.0067 7.40 0.0079 10.38 −0.0597 −38.59
6 0.0055 8.85 0.0067 11.90 −0.0534 −47.89
7 0.0046 11.02 0.0042 3.64 −0.0423 −32.13
8 0.0026 5.82 0.0034 5.85 −0.0359 −28.80
9 0.0022 6.88 0.0029 3.66 −0.0265 −29.25
10 −0.0002 −0.44 0.0001 0.58 −0.0180 −26.73
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Figure IA.1: HFTs’ Share of NASDAQ Dollar Volume
This figure shows HFTs’ share of dollar volume on the NASDAQ Stock Market. The calculation includes all stocks
with CRSP share code 10 or 11 trading on NASDAQ, regardless of listing venue.
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Figure IA.2: Liquidity Removing Trades as a Percent of HFT Dollar Volume
This figure shows liquidity removing trades as a percent of HFTs’ dollar volume on the NASDAQ Stock Market.
Liquidity removing trades are those in which the HFT initiates the trade with a marketable order, which is functionally
equivalent to a market order. The calculation includes all stocks with CRSP share code 10 or 11 trading on NASDAQ,
regardless of listing venue.
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Figure IA.3: Market Share By Trading Venue
Market share is reported as percent of dollar volume. NASDAQ is the NASDAQ Stock Market, NYSE is the New
York Stock Market, and TRF is the FINRA Trade Reporting Facility that includes trades that do not occur on a
stock exchange (e.g., trades executed in dark pools or by off-exchange market making firms).
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Figure IA.4: Response of non-HFT and HFT Net Marketable Buying to a 100 Share
Shock to the Other Trader Type
This figure plots the impulse response function of non-HFT net marketable buying to a 100 share shock to HFT
net marketable buying, and then the response of HFT net marketable buying to a 100 share shock to non-HFT
net marketable buying. The solid line is the estimated response function, and dotted lines indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Estimates come from the VAR in Table 3:
Rt =α1+
J∑
i=1
γ1,iHFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
β1,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
λ1,iRt−i +²1,t
HFTNMB,t =α2+
J∑
i=1
γ2,iHFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
β2,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
λ2,iRt−i +²2,t
non-HFTNMB,t =α3+
J∑
i=1
γ3,iHFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
β3,inon-HFTNMB,t−i +
J∑
i=1
λ3,iRt−i +²3,t
where Rt is NBBO midpoint return, HFTNMB,t is HFT net marketable buying, non-HFTNMB,t is non-HFT net
marketable buying, and J is the number of lags. Variables are measured at the one-second horizon and divided
by their standard deviation among all stocks that day. Net marketable buying is shares bought in buyer-initiated
trades minus shares sold in seller-initiated trades. Imbalances are divided by 20-day trailing average daily volume
to make them comparable across stocks. Equations are estimated for each stock every day. Coefficients are then
averaged across all stocks for a day, with stocks weighted by the minimum number of non-zero observations among
the three variables. The full-sample estimate is the mean of that daily coefficient time-series. Standard errors correct
for autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1994) optimal lag selection method. The impulse response functions
assume no contemporaneous effects among variables, so the ordering of the variables does not matter.
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